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1. Introduction 
High European equ i l ibrium unemployment is the most important 
economic development in the last fifteen years. Macroeconomists have 
put a lot of effort into trying to explain it. The studies made for the 
first Chelwood Gate conference, collected in the book The Rise in 
Unemployment, analysed the roles of real wages and demand contraction 
in the increase of unemployment after 1973, but then the persistence of 
high unemployment over time became the main issue. This task was picked 
up by the second Chelwood Gate conference, which studied the role of 
capital constraints and insider wage setting in generating persistence. 
Among the common findings across countries in the latter conference, as 
summarised by . Dreze ( 1990 ) ,  was that employment was consistently and 
significantly below the minimum of labour supply, classical and 
keynesian employment. 
Deficient matching between labour supply and demand became a natural 
suspect for this finding, and so the first steps are being taken, for 
example in several chapters of this book, in developing a theory of 
mismatch. At the same time, it is useful to provide empirical evidence 
on the various dimensions of mismatch, at the very least to find out 
which are more relevant for each country. This paper is devoted to the 
latter task for .the case of Spain. 
Spain had very low unemployment, around 1%, in the 1960s but then 
experienced a sustained increase in the 1970s and the first half of the 
1980s, reaching a 21.5% rate in 1985, by far the highest in the OECD. 
Since then the unemployment rate has drifted downwards, reaching 17. 2% 
in 1989. Thus, unfortunately, Spain is an interesting country to study 
the persistence of unemployment and of mismatch as a potential cause 
for it. 
Bentol i la and Blanchard (990) analyse the causes of the rise in 
unemployment in Spain and argue, in l ine with insider-outsider 
theories, that one of these causes is that high unemployment induces 
changes in the labour market through which increases in actual 
unemployment can lead to rises in equil ibrium unemployment , 1. e. , the 
so-called hysteresis effect. In particular, they argue that the 
-6-
prolonged period of high unemployment in Spain has contributed to a 
reduction of the search intensity of the unemployed, and in particular 
of the willingness to look for work in regions other than their own, 
i. e.  a source of mismatch from the labour supply side. 
In order to learn about the likelihood of mismatch being an 
important cause for the rise in Spanish unemployment, we follow an 
eclectic approach, approaching the issue from several �ngles. One view, 
Jackman, Layard and Savouri' s  (1990) in one of the chapters in this 
volume, equates mismatch to relative unemployment rate dispersion. In 
the first part of Section 2 we document that, in fact, unemployment 
rate imbalances in absolute terms have greatly widened in Spain as the 
national rate was rising. Nevertheless, when we compute a relative 
unemployment rate dispersion measure we find that it has fallen over 
time according to most characteristics of the labour force, seemingly 
implying that mismatch has been falling, not rising, over time. 
In the second part of Section 2 we pursue a different strategy. 
Disequilibrium models interpret mismatch as arising from heterogeneity 
of regimes (classical, keynesian, repressed inf lation) across different 
sectors in the economy. Thus, in line with the Chelwood Gate I I  
conference approach, we take the estimated measure of mismatch derived 
from the disequilibrium model fitted to the Spanish economy, and 
regress it on variables related to mismatch, such as the proportion of 
long-term unemployed in the labour force. regional unemployment rate 
dispersion. Interregional migration flows, relative energy prices, or 
employment turbulence, finding a very good fit. This suggests that this 
measure might be a good proxy for overall mismatch in Spain. 
Unfortunately, it behaves exactly in the opposite way that the 
dispersion indices commented on above do: it rises steadily until the 
mid-1980s, and then falls a little. It clearly implies that mismatch is 
today at historically high levels in Spain. At the end of Section 2 we 
list a number of reasons leading us to think that the latter index 
might be giving a more accurate view than the former ones. 
Final ly, the fact that regional variables play an key role in 
explaining the latter index of mismatch reinforces our previous belief 
that the geographical aspect of the labour market is important in 
understanding the rise in unemployment in Spain. There have always been 
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genuine differences in language, uses, etc. across Spanish regions, and 
this could easily lead to the segmentat ion of markets. Also, migration 
flows, which in the early 1960s were high both towards Europe and 
within Spain, have fallen dramatically coinciding with the rise in 
unemployment. Bentol i l a  and Blanchard (1990) stress the rise in overal l  
unemployment as the main factor inhibi ting labour mobi l i ty in Spain. In 
Section 3 we analyse this proposi t ion by sett ing up an econometric 
model of internal migration in Spain. We f ind that net interregional 
migration flows respond to economic incent ives, in particular to 
unemployment and wage different ials, but with low elasticities and long 
lags. Therefore the observed fall in these flows can be partially 
explained by the reductions in such differentials that has taken place 
are deterred by housing 
unemployment rate. In 
increase as the overal l  
in Spain. We also f ind that migration f lows 
price differentials1 and by the overall 
consequence, while labour mobi l i ty w i l l  
unemployment rate continues to f a l l  i n  the next few years. this process 
is bound to be slow, and there is a role for policy in speeding up the 
process. We dwe l l  on some such measures at the end of Section 3. 
Finally, Section 4 draws some prel iminary conclusions and opens 
issues for future research. 
2. Stylized facts of Spanish unemployment and mismatch indices 
2. 1.  Evolution over t ime 
In this subsection we sketch an account of the evolution of Spanish 
unemployment over time, depicted in Figure 1. From 1960 to 1914 Spain 
made the transi t ion from an agricultural to an industrial economy, and 
experienced high growth, low unemployment ,  moderate inflat ion and high 
productivity growth. In 1915 Franco died, and the two years it took to 
get pol i t ical institutions back in order saw a wage explosion and the 
transmission of wage costs and the oil price shock into booming 
inflat ion (25% in 1911 ) .  The inflat ionary momentum was broken by 
contractionary monetary policy and a series of nationwide agreements on 
1 Echoing the theme of Muel lbauer and Murphy (1989). 
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FIGURE 1: National Unemployment Rote 
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wage growth, whereby wage moderation was progressively attained. 
The reduction of inflat ion implied the cost of a sharp slowdown and 
a large increase in unemployment, which reached a staggering 21. 5% in 
1985. The causes of the increase have been extensively analysed (see 
Dolado et al. ( 1986 ) ,  Fina ( 1987 ) ,  Andres et al. ( 1990) or Bentol i la 
and Blanchard, (1990» . The initial rise in unemployment can be 
attributed to the large increases in real wages and the contract ionary 
monetary policies that ensued. There is much less consensus about the 
continued rise in the 1980s. Bentol i l a  and Blanchard (1990 ) single out 
three factors in explaining such rise: a profi t  squeeze which led many 
firms to bankruptcy and the remaining ones to curtail investment, a 
productive reorganisation effort which caused massive labour shedding, 
and hysteresis effects, by which equilibrium unemployment rose with 
actual unemployment . In this paper we are specially concerned with the 
latter. 
The l i terature on hysteresis, which originally stressed the lack of 
concern of insider wage setters for the interests of unemployed 
outsiders, has r.ecently shifted emphasis towards the determinants of 
the pressure from the unemployed on the wage set t ing process (Layard 
and Nickel! (1987». Hysteresis arises if depressed labour markets lead 
to less downward wage pressure from outsiders. This may happen if, for 
instance, the long-term unemployed lose ski l l s  or get discouraged and 
stop searching. 
As in most European countries, equil ibrium unemployment -1. e. the 
rate compatible with steady inflat ion or NAIRU- has risen in Spain, 
although not as much as actual unemployment , since inflation has fallen 
after 1977; and it is a common f inding that unemployment puts little 
downward pressure on wages in Spain (e.  g. Dolado and Malo de Mol ina 
(1985 ) ,  Dolado et al. (1986 ) ,  or Andres and Garcia (1989». Moreover, 
in 1986-88, a boom period in which output and employment grew 
respectively by 4. 7% and 2. 7% annually, unemployment fell only by two 
In contrast. 
17. 2%, but 
percentage points, from 21. 5% in 1985 to 19. 5% in 1988. 
during 1989, unemployment has fallen more quickly, to 
inflation has accelerated by two percentage points, to 6 . 8%, an 
overheating typically arising near equilibrium unemployment.  
The long period of high unemployment in Spain has likely induced 
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changes in the behaviour of the unemployed, towards reduc ing their 
search effort and so decreasing downward pressure on wage bargains. 
There are several features consistent with this: the stigma of being 
unemployed is mostly gone, the pool of the unemployed has been 
relatively stagnant unt i l  recent ly, unemployment fal ls mostly on 
spouses and the youth -who can survive while being out of work- and, 
finally, migration f lows, which were high in the early 1960s, are now 
quite small. 
How much of the rise in equilibrium unemployment can be attributed 
to mismatch? lie lack a fully worked out model of the relationship 
between· the NAIRU and mismatch, and do not develop one in this paper. 
Instead, we fol low an eclectic approach, by comput ing two sets of 
measures which, under two different models, proxy for mismatch. If we 
were to get similar answers from both measures, we would the feel 
confident to have found a robust stylised fact. The two models we are· 
referring to are the Jackman-Layard-Savouri (JLS ) mul tisectoral model 
of determination of the NAIRU, and the Sneesens-Dreze disequi l ibrium 
mode l .  In the next two subsect ions we take each in turn. 
2 . 2 .  Mismatch as unemployment rate dispersion 
In their chapter, JLS derive a relation between mismatch and the 
NAIRU in a mult isectoral model, using two building blocks: the factor 
price frontier arising from a Cobb-Douglas production funct ion, and a 
double-logarithmic wage function whereby sectoral wages depend on their 
own unemployment rate. The combination of both elements gives rise to 
an unemployment frontier, i.e. the locus of a l l  combinat ions of 
sectoral unemployment rates consistent with the absence of inflationary 
pressure. In this setup, the movement of unemployed workers from 
relatively high to relatively low unemployment rate sectors can reduce 
the national unemployment rate wi thout raising inflation. As a 
consequence, unemployment rate dispersion is a Sign of mismatch, a 
natural measure of the latter turning out to be (half ) the squared 
coeff icient of variation of sectoral unemployment rates, i . e. :  
MM [ 1 ]  
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where ui denotes the unemployment rate of sector (group) i and uN the 
national rate (hereafter the subindex N denotes the national value of a 
variable ) .  
In the application of this mode l, before reporting computed MM 
indices, we document that, in fact. important unemployment rate 
imbalances have developed in Spain as unemployment was rising. We 
present, in Table 1, the breakdown of unemployment by age, sex and 
ski l l  in (the fourth quarter of ) three selected years. · I ts composi t ion 
has shifted towards the 20-to-54 year old group, and by 1989 more than 
half of the unemployed were in their prime age. St i l l ,  since the latter 
is the largest group in the labour force, their unemployment rate is 
. always much lower than the youngest workers' rate, which reached 55% in 
1985. Turning now to the sex composi t ion of unemployment, Women have 
gone from being a third to a half of the unemployed, with their 
unemployment rate almost doubling the male rate by 1989. 
Table 2 shows the regional structure of unemployment. Unemployment 
rate divergence has great ly increased over time, as evidenced by Figure 
2, which plots the sum of the absolute differences in unemployment 
rates across regions, weighted by their labour force share. 
Do these imbalances translate into growing mismatch, as measured by 
the MM index? 
2 to 1989, by 
Table 3 presents, and Figure 3 plots, the index from 1977 
3 sex, age, education, ski l l  and sector. The age, sector 
and education dimensions a l l  show decreasing values over time; the sex 
and ski l l  indices are stable up to 1985 and increase afterwards. The 
latter two are, therefore, the only ones consistent with the widespread 
percept ion of increasing mismatch in Spain in the last few years. The 
fal l  in the former three indices reveals that, although absolute 
differences in unemployment rates have increased over time, relative 
2 The first complete year for which we have homogeneous data is 1977. 
3 Not a l l  characteristics are equal ly interesting: change of sex is 
(almost ) impossible, change of age is exogenous, and the sectoral 
classification is not very informative, since workers do not 
necessarily f ind jobs in the same sector where they worked last. 
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TABLE L COMPOSITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Fourth quarter, Xl 
Percentage structure Unemployment rate 
1976 1985 1989 1976 1985 1989 
Al AGE: 
16-19 years old 31. 5 19.8 12.8 17.1 54.9 36.6 
20-24 years old 19.6 28.3 27.7 10.6 42.5 32.3 
25-54 years old 43.0 46.6 52.8 3.6 15.7 13.5 
55 years old + 5.9 5.4 6.7 2.1 8.0 8.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.9 21. 2 16.9 
Bl SEX: 
Hale 65.7 59.2 49.2 5.2 18.6 12.7 
Female 34.3 40.8 50.8 6.8 27.6 24.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.9 21.2 18.5 
Cl SKILL: 
Professional and 
managerial 1.9 2.4 3.1 1.2 6.0 4.9 
Clerical 4.8 5.2 6.3 2.4 11. 0 9.3 
Other non manual 3.7 4.6 4.3 1.9 10.3 7.5 
Unskilled 89.6 87.8 86.2 6.0 26.1 21. 5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.9 21.2 16.9 
Sources: See Appendix 2. 
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TABLE 2: REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
(annual averages, Xl 
1962 1976 1985 
Andalucia 3.4 9.9 29.2 
Arag6n 0.2 2.5 17.2 
AsturIas 0.3 3.4 18.0 
Baleares 0.4 3.9 13.5 
CanarIas 1.1 8.3 25.7 
CantabrIa 0.5 2.9 15.5 
Castllla-La Mancha 0.5 4.5 15.5 
Castilla-Le6n 0.3 4.2 17.6 
Catalufta 0.9 3.4 21. 7 
Pais Vasco 0.2 3.7 22.7 
Extremadura 1.7 8.0 27.0 
Gallcla 0.4 1.7 13.1 
MadrId 1.1 5.1 21. 1 
Murcia 1.4 4.8 18.9 
Navarra 0.1 3.9 18.8 
La RIoJa 0.3 1.8 16.5 
Valencia 1.2 3.6 19.9 
National average 1.1 4.3 21. 4 
Sources: See AppendIx 2. 
1989 
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TABLE 3: MM MISMATCH INDICES ill 
Sex � Education Skill 
0.6 28.5 2.8 7.1 
1.3 32.6 4.9 6.6 
1.1 31. 4 6.4 6.9 
1.0 30.9 5.1 7.0 
1.1 29.5 5. 7 6.8 
1.4 27.2 5.8 6.5 
1.4 25.3 5.7 6.4 
1.4 23.3 4.9 7.0 
1.6 20.3 4.3 6.7 
2.2 19.2 3.5 7.6 
3.2 18.3 3.4 8.8 
4.6 25.0 3.5 8.6 
5.8 25.0 2.3 8. 7 
Sources: See Appendix 2. 
Sector 
27.2 
24.8 
25.8 
24.2 
21. 7 
18.1 
16.1 
15. 7 
11. 7 
8.4 
6.4 
2.9 
2.5 
Note: The level of disaggregation is: (a) Age, 3 groups (16 to 24, 
25 to 54 and 55 or more years old); (b) Education, 5 groups 
(illiterate, primary school, high school ,  vocational training and 
university); (c ) Skil l ,  4 groups (as in Table 1); ( d )  Sector, 4 
groups (agriculture and fishing , manufacturing, construction and 
services. 
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FIGURE 3: Mismatch indices 
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differences have fallen. For instance, in 1 97604 the difference between 
the prime-age and the 16-to-19 year old unemployment rates was 1 5  
percentage points, r ising t o  23 p. p. by 1989Q4. However the former rate 
quadrupled from 1976 to 1989, while the latter only doubled . 
. The case of regions, for which we compute a series start ing in 1962 
and report the results in Table 4 and Figure 4, is quite striking. In 
1962, when 
unemployment 
national unemployment was very low, 
dispersion was very high; but i t  fell 
geographical 
dramatically 
afterwards, bottoming out in 1985, when national unemployment reached 
its maximum. The reason is the same as before: absolute differences in 
unemployment rates increased substantially, but the denominator of the 
MM index, the national rate, rose so much more than the numerator that 
i t  dwarfed the latter ' s  increase. Since 1985 regional dispersion has 
been increasing again, as the national rate was fal l ing. 
2.3. Mismatch as micro-market constraint heterogeneity 
A different measure of mismatch results from the model common to all 
papers in the aforementioned Chelwood Gate 11 conference. The model is 
explained in detail by Dreze (1990 ) ,  so here we only review i ts main 
features. I t  is a disequil ibrium model ,  in which rat ioning arises from 
wage and price stickiness as well as from short-run rigidity of 
technical coefficients of production. As is usual in these models, 
employment can be constrained by lack of demand, 1. e.  the keynesian 
regime, lack of productive capacity, i . e . the classical regime, or lack 
of labour, i . e . the repressed inflation regime. If every sector in the 
economy were constrained in an ident ical way, aggregate employment 
would equal the minimum of the three employment levels above. Such a 
si tuation . being highly unlikely, aggregation is performed in the model 
allowing for heterogeneity of constraints. In particular, aggregation 
is done via a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function whose 
parameter, IIp, turns out to measure the degree of disparity in the 
rat ioning regime of different sectors: the latter goes to zero as p 
goes to infinity. Mismatch is in this way identified with regime 
disparity across sectors, and is revealed by actual employment being 
lower than the minimum of labour supply, classical and keynesian 
employment .  
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The variable lip measures frict ional ( structural) unemployment. To 
understand why we need to recal l  the CES equation giving aggregate 
emp 1 oymen t , L: 
L = (LK-P + LP-P + LS-P) lip [2]  
where LK and LP are Keynesian and classical employment and LS is labour 
supply. Now if LK=LP=LS, then L = 3-P LS, so that: 
lip = ( log 3)-1 u [3]  
where u = 1 - (L/LS ) is the frictional unemployment rate, and we have 
used the approximation 10g ( 1+x )  = x. This expression also serves to 
show that lip is in the same ( rescaled ) units as the unemployment rate. 
F igure 5 shows lip as est imated for Spain, in Andres et al. ( 1 990 ) ,  
by one of us and other col leagues. I t  increases slowly up to 1973, 
quickly from 1974 to 1985, and falls slowly afterwards; i . e. it fol lows 
a path similar to that of the unemployment rate. Can we account for the 
behaviour of lip using economic variables related to mismatch? Andres 
et al. regressed p on a trend ( t ) ,  a proxy of mismatch (PMM) , and ( the 
logari thm of ) an index of the relative price of energy inputs (LPRH ) .  
PMM is Layard and Nickell ' s (1986) turbulence index, i . e. the sum of 
4 absolute changes in sectoral shares of employmen t,  though Andres et 
al. use dependent employment instead of total employmen t.  This variable 
should capture the need for relocation of labour across sectors as the 
composition of employment changes,  being therefore positively 
correlated with mismatch; LPRH should also increase mismatch, by 
changing the relative price of inputs. 
Est imating the equation for lip, instead of p, for 1965-87, we get: 
(t-ratios in parenthesi s )  
4 Formal ly: PMM = r 1 � (Ni/N) I , where N i is employment in sector i and 
N is total employmen t.  The sectors are: agriculture, industry, 
construction and serv ices. 
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FIGURE 5: Estimated mismatch 
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(PHHt+
PHH
t_1 ) + 0. 005 (LP
RH
t
+LPRH
t_1 ) 
(2. 90 ) 
R2 
= 0. 95, DW = 0. 22,  se = 0. 005. 
[ 4 )  
The signs are as expected, but there i s  strong evidence of 
nonstationarity in the' residuals. We would also like to know what 
explains the trend. To subst i tute for i t ,  fol lowing Padoa Schioppa 
(989 ) ,  we chose the fol lowing variables: the unwe ighted standard 
deviation of regional unemployment rates (500 ) , 5 gross interregional 
migration as a proportion of total population (GMI ) ,  and the proportion 
of long-term unemployed ( 1  year or more ) in the labour force (LTU ) .  The 
first and third variables should raise mismatch, the second should 
lower i t .  Finally, we use the turbulence index for total employment 
(1"URB) , plotted in Figure 6 ,  instead of PMM. The results are as ­
fol lows: 
l/pt = 0. 054 
(20. 80) 
+ 0. 007 Soot_l 
(7. 30 )  
- 0. 023 GMI t 
(5. 38 )  
+ 0. 00 1  TURBt + 0. 006 LPRHt 
(2. 41 )  (6. 27 )  
+ 0. 002 LTUt 
(8. 72 )  
R2 = 0. 99, DW = 1 . 93, se = 0. 0016. 
[5 )  
The f i t  i s  now much more satisfactory, with no sign of residual 
serial correlation. We t ried quadratic terms of LTU and TURB but, 
contrary to Padoa Schioppa's ( 1989) finding for Italy, they were not 
significant at a l l .  We also run the regression reintroducing the trend 
term, but it was insignificant ( t-ratio of 1 . 49 ) ,  implying that we have 
successfully explained away the trend. 
Can we account for the fal l in mismatch, as measured by lip, in 
1986-87? Yes, three variables behaved positively: gross migration 
5 SDU is the square root of JLS' s MM index, but unweighted. 
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increased in those two years, the proportion of long-term unemployed 
fel l ,  and so did the price of energy imports. They overcame the 
cont inued rise in regional unemployment rate dispersion and the 1986 
turbulence blip. 
This measure of mismatch does, unfortunately, give a different 
answer from JLS' s MM index. The latter fa lls according to most 
characteristics of the labour force, while l/p, which is an overal l  
measure, steadi ly increases over time. 
The units of measurement help explain the different behavior of the 
two indices. MM is a squared coefficient of variation, i . e. a ( squared) 
standard deviation divided by a ( squared) mean , it is therefore 
dimensionless. But l/p is in the same units as the unemployment rate 
(see equa tion [3]),  i . e. in the square root of the units of the 
numerator of MM .  As we ment ioned before, the latter does rise steadi ly 
over time (as does the index of absolute unemploymen t rate differences 
plot ted in Figure 2 ) ,  but its rise is dwarfed by that of the 
denominator, the national unemployment rate. 
The matter thus boils down to the fol lowing question: is it on ly 
relative unemploymen t rate dispersion that matters or do absolute 
unemployment rates and differentials also provide independently 
valuable information about mismatch? To put i t  more bluntly: suppose 
that an economy has two types of labour w i th equa l size labour forces 
and w i th respective unemployment rates of 2% and 4%. Is mismatch the 
same if the latter are 10% and 20%? The MM index says so, but this is 
hard to accept. Higher unemployment is usua l ly associated w i th a higher 
proportion of long-term unemploymen t ,  for example, which is Itself 
likely to produce mismatch. The catch is that mismatch may be both a 
cause for the persistence of high unemployment and a consequence of it. 
In summary, we think the numerator of MM to be interesting on its own. 
In the case of Spain, two reasons induce us to believe that l/p 
might be giving a more accurate picture, in the sense that mismatch is 
nowadays in Spa in at historica l ly high levels.  First, we find no 
evidence in Section 3 below of double-logarithmic wage ( i . e. , concave) 
equat ions at the regional level ,  a specification which is clearly 
rejected in favour of a semi-logari thmic form. Second, if mismatch had 
rea lly been fall ing according to most dimensions (and dramatica l ly in 
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some of them ) ,  it would be very difficult to understand the overhea ting 
currently taking place in Spa in. 
We end this section by noting that two regional variables help 
explain lip; (unweighted) unemployment rate dispersion and migration 
flows. The latter have been fal l ing steadily since the early 1960s, a 
fact which we would need to explain in order to improve our 
understanding of mismatch in Spa in. Further insigh't requires, however, 
formal mode l l ing of the role of unemployment rate disparities, and 
their interaction w i th wage setting, in the regional labour al location 
process. We undertake this task in the follow ing section. 
3. Analysis of migration flows 
In this section we analyse the behaviour of internal migration flows 
in Spain since 1962. We review a few stylised facts, set up a framework 
of analysis and comment on the time path of our explanatory variables. 
Fina l ly, we report our est imation results and derive policy 
implications from them. 
3. 1 .  Sty l i zed facts 
Even though Spa in is a relatively sma l l  country, there are genuine 
differences between regions in terms of weather, language, traditions, 
etc. , which have played an important role in Spanish history. The 
tradit ional administrative division is into 50 provinces, but these 
have always been grouped 1nto regions, whose limits have changed over 
time. The current structure, dating from 1978, consists of 17 so-cal led 
Autonomous COl11l11lni ties. which have their own par l iaments and 
governments" with wide-ranging political powers. 
Spanish 
mill ion in 
population has increased from 31 million in 1962 to 38 . 5  
6 1986. Migration flows were very high in Spain in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. Gross outflows to other,  mainly European, countries 
6 Due to lack of data for most variables after 1986, in the remainder 
of the paper we restrict ourselves to the period 1962-86. 
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averaged 0. 3% of the population in 1960-74. They then fe l l  
dramatically, to 0. 06% over 1975-86, being overcome by returns, so that 
net migration was negative unt i l  1980, and positive but negligible 
afterwards. 
Interprov incial migration flows, as a percentage of population, were 
very high in the early 1960s, but have been fall ing sInce: the 1962-69 
average was 1 . 22%, it was 1 . 09% in 1970-75 and 0. 92% over 1976-86. The 
decline is more marked for interregional flows, i . e . �xcluding 
within-region moves, which, for those three periods were, respectively, 
equal to 0. 65%, 0. 50% and 0. 36%. The reason is that intraregional flows 
have grown at the same rate as the population, while interregional 
flows have fallen in absolute terms; as a result the former went from 
representing 46% of total interprov incial migration in the 1960s to ·61% 
over 1976-86. Figure 7 plots interregional f lows since 1962, both the 
official series and the adjusted one we use in our regression analysis 
(see below ) .  
Some information on the characteristics of migrants i s  available. As 
expected, young people -under 25 years old- are more l ikely to move: 
over 1962-86 they represented almost half of all migrants, but just to 
42% of the population. In the 1960s the proportions of young people in 
both the populat ion and migration were increasing, but the 1970s and 
1980s show an ageing of both the population -42% were young in 1970, 
40% in 1986- and migration -51% of migrants were young in 1970, only 
46% in 1986-. In terms of sex , even though the partic ipation of women 
in the populat ion has increased, from 48. 5% in 1960 to 49% in 1986, 
their share of migration has fal len, from 53% in 1962 to 51% in 1986. 
Finally, the available data on labour force status are quite useless. 
Most migrants (around 60%) are classified as non-active, but it is 
unclear if this only considers Qut-of-the-labour-force migrants or if 
some or all of the unemployed workers are counted in. Within those 
label led as active, around three-quarter·s are manual workers in the 
1960s, with the proportion declining in the 1970s and 1980s in favour 
of skilled non-manual workers, which amoun t to almost 40% of all 
migrants in 1986. 
In order to highl ight other features of migration, we have grouped , 
looking at per-capita income and gross migration flows, the 17 
E 
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FIGURE 7: Interregional Migration Rote 
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administrative regions into more aggregate regions (In the spirit of 
Attanas io and Padoa Schioppa in one of the chapters in this volume ) .  We 
distinguish five super-regions: Big Cities (BC ) ,  North (NO ) ,  Northeast 
(NE ) ,  Centre (CE) and South (SO); Figure 8 and Appendix 1 provide 
information on regions and their grouping. The South is the most 
agricultural ,  less developed region, followed by the Centre. The most 
advanced, with strong industrial and service sectors, is the Big Cities 
region ( the big cities are Madrid and Barcelona ) ,  followed by the 
North, which specialised in basic industries but also kept important 
farming and fishing sectors. F igure 9 shows that, in terms of 
per-capita GDP, the former are the poorest areas and the latter the 
richest. The NE region is in between, and i t  was joined by NO in the 
late 1970s. The f igure also reveals that, though slowly, dispari t ies in . 
per capita income have been closing. 
It is interest ing to look at the relative position of regions with 
respect to other variables. In the 1960s and 1970s, the SO and CE 
regions lost population in favour of BC, whi le in the 1980s population 
shares have stabil ised. In F igure 10 we can see that unemployment is 
highest in SO, lowest in CE and also a surprisingly bad unemployment 
performance of BC. These facts result from the behav iour of the labour 
force and employment over time. Since 1975 employment fel l  everywhere, 
while the labour force was more or less stable in NO, NE and SO, fel l  
in CE ( accounting for its lower unemployment rate) and rose in BC 
( accounting for its bad unemployment record ) .  
Figures 1 1  and 12 portray gross out- and inmigration rates. They 
show a clear pattern unti l  1976: SO and CE had high gross outflows ( the 
other regions had low ones ) ;  and BC, NO and NE had sizable gross 
inflows. The result, in Figure 13, is immediate: high net inflows to 
the latter three regions mirroring high net outflows from the former 
two. The picture is much more muddled after 1976, when gross flows 
become low everywhere and the regions' roles reverse: BC and NO become 
net senders and the SO becomes a net receiver (probably due to return 
migration), while CE ends up in balance. 
Turning to wages and prices, the real ( consumption) wages per 
employee fol low a similar pattern as real per capita GDP (Figure 9 ) ,  
except that wages in NO remain closer to BC' s than to NE wages, whi le 
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FIGURE 9: Per capita real GOP 
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FIGURE 11: Gross Outmigrotion Rotes 
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FIGURE 13: Net Inmigratian Rates 
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wages in CE are more similar to the latter than to those in SO. These 
disparities in the behaviour of wages and per-capita income point out 
to differences in the evolution of non-wage income across regions. 
Consumer prices have grown more in BC and NO than elsewhere. Finally, 
housing price indices show higher than average increases in SO and 
lower ones in the NO and CE . 
We now turn to a formal analysis of migration flows. 
3. 2. Framework of analysis 
There is a vast l i terature on migration theory and its empirical 
applications. 7 The two leading, complementary approaches are the labour 
flow and the human capital models. The former is grounded on the idea 
that, in equil ibrium, factors of production should receive the same 
return in every region, as long as factors are mobile. Migration is 
thus viewed as the response of labour to wage inequalities across 
regions. In the human capital approach, people move to maximise their 
expected l ifetime ut i l i ty across regions, which takes into account all 
features of l ife in a given place, both economic and non-economic. The 
model we use is a generalisation of the well-known Harris-Todaro ( 1970) 
model ,  which has been recently adapted by Pissarides and Wadsworth 
( 1 987) to derive the probability that a person will  migrate, as a 
function of personal characteristics and market variables. 
The approach we take adapts the previous models to a pooled 
regression context, along 
in the ir study of regional 
the l ines of Pissarides and McMaster ( 1984) 
8 migration in the U . K . The basic idea is to 
compute the differential between expected returns and costs of moving, 
and examine which variables affect such different ial.  The higher the 
differential,  the higher will be the probability of migrating. Suppose 
7 See, for example, the recent survey by Shields and Shields ( 1990) 
and the references therein. 
8 Al though we were not aware of their paper when we wrote the first 
draft of ours. 
- 31 -
that there are two regions, 1 and 2, and we want to model the net 
inflow of migrants to region 1 .  Each region has an unemployment rate ui 
and a wage rate wi 0
=1, 2 ) ,  and there is an unemployment benefit,  
available to all the unemployed, which is a given proportion b of the 
wage rate. There are also costs of moving from one region to another,  
including travel fares, rental or purchase of a house , etc.  For 
analyt ical convenience we write the costs of l iv ing in a given region 
as a proportion c i of the respect ive wage , so that the relevant wage 
rate is the net wage , Wi " wi Cl-ci ) .  In this form the cost of moving 
from region 2 to region 1 can be expressed as cl-cZ" The expected 
return for a worker in regIon 1 is: 
where 0 < b, c .  < 1.  1 
[6]  
Denoting by H i  the net migration into region 1 ,  then the probabil ity 
of migrat ing is given by: 
[1]  
where the return different ial is:  
[8]  
To examine the effects of moving costs and the unemployment and wage 
rates on the probability of moving, i t  i s  useful to write: 
w1 
= w2 + dw 
. 
l '  
u1 
= u2 
+ dUt; 
C
l c2 
+ dc1: 
w2 
u2 
c2 
= w 
= u 
= c 
[9a] 
[9b] 
[9c] 
where dj l (j=w, u, c )  represents the respective differential, and w, u 
and c capture the respective overall leve ls effects. Substitut ing 
[9a-c] into [8]  we get: 
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which, by assuming that the cross-differential terms are of smaller 
order of magnitude, can be approximated by: 
The effects of the differentials on OR1 are given by: 
80R1/8dw1 = ( l -c )  [ l - ( l-b ) u) > 0 
80R1/8du1 = - ( l-b) w ( l-c) < 0 
- w [ 1  - ( l-b)u) < 0 
[ 12a) 
[ 1 2b) 
[ 12cJ 
Therefore net migration into region 1 ,  H1 , depends positively on the 
wage differential and negatively on the unemployment and moving cost 
differentials, all with respect to region 2.  
I t  is also easy to derive the effects of the overal l levels on OR1 : 
80R1/8W = - dc [ l - ( l-b)u) - (l-b)du ( l -c )  [ 13aJ 1 1 
80R1/8u 
= - (l-b) [dw1 ( 1 -c) - wdc1 ) [ 13bJ 
80R1/8c ( 1 -b ) du1w - dw1 [ 1 - ( 1-b)u) [ 13c ) 
80R1/8b ( l-c)  [udw 1
+wdu1J - uwdc1 [ 13dJ 
The sign of the four previous effects are, in genera l ,  ambiguous , 
but can be determined for particular cases. For example, [ 1 3a )  implies 
that a higher overal l wage reduces migration into regions with higher 
unemployment and higher cost of moving, and [ 13b) says that higher 
overal l  unemployment discourages inflows into regions with higher wages 
and lower costs of moving. In any event, the Sign of all the leve l 
effects have to be determined empirically. 
In summary, we can represent the probab i l i ty of net inflows to 
region i by: 
[ 14J 
where f is a function satisfying f 1>O, f2<0 and f3<O, and the remaining 
signs are ambiguous. We reserve ci for the monetary costs of living in 
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i region i and Z for other relat ive characteristics, including the 
weather ,  public services like education or health care, and amenities. 
3. 3 Econome tric analysis of migration 
We now present the results of est imating a formal mode l of 
migration. We are concerned with three basic issues. First, we examine 
how do regional migration rates respond to regional real wage and 
unemployment levels and differentials, and to moving costs. Second, we 
analyse the extent to which these different ials persist in the face of 
migration. Third, we draw some implications from those adjustment 
processes for regional economic policy. To deal with the first two 
issues we est imate two pooled cross section-time series regression 
equations, one for net interregional migration rates and another for 
regional wage differentials. We close the model by introducing a third 
equation in an ad hoc manner ,  l inking the absolute variation in 
unemployment with net migration rates, which is derived as a pseudo", 
� "  
identity and hence i t  i s  not estimated. We take each equation i n  ·'turn. 
Net migration equation 
For est imation purposes we use an empirical speCification of the 
probability of migration, similar to the one used by Pissarides and 
HcHaster ( 1984) for the U.K. and also by the closest piece of work on 
Spain we know of, Sant i l lana (1978 ) .  The latter est imates several 
cross-section mode ls of bi lateral migration flows between Spanish 
provinces, for' selected years between 1960 and 1973. This study f inds a 
significant response of migration to economic variables, mainly to 
earnings differentials, as wel l  as an important positive effect of the 
stock of migrants in the province of destination, which the author 
interprets as proxying for a reduct ion in informational and settl ing 
down costs for new migrants. In contrast ,  we analyse the more aggregate 
interregional flows while substantially enlarging the period, and we 
use a pool ing approach to estimation. 
The ideal dependent variable would be the movements of workers 
between regions, but we only have data on population flows. Our 
dependent variable , mi t , is equal to the ne t flows into a region 
divided by the region's population in the previous year, which 
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9 approximates the probability concept. The alternative of estimat ing 
separate equations for gross flows was discarded because the 
unidirectional ity of f lows makes gross and net migration behave quite 
al ike for most of the period. As shown in Figure 7. the official data 
on gross migration present extreme ly low peaks every five' years, 
coinCiding with census years. We believe this is an anomaly due to the 
collection of the new census in those years and h�ve proceeded to 
smooth out the peaks. by l inearly interpolating each region' s gross 
10 flows. as in the adjusted series in Figure 7.  
The regressors. Xi' are wage and unemployment differentials with 
respect to nationwide levels. i . e. dUi=ui-� and dwi=wi -wN• and a set i of extra variables. 2 . proxying for costs of mov ing. risk averSion, 
employment structure. influence of external migration. etc . .  which we 
discuss below. In order to capture level effects of overall 
unemployment and wage rates, we al low for regression coefficients to 
1 1  depend inversely on such leve ls,  so that the est imated mode l is: 
( i= l  . . . . •  N; t=l • . . . •  Tl [ 15J 
This implies, for example. the presence of absolute differences, dUi 
and dwi . and relative differences. defined as rUi=ui/� and rwi=wi/wN• 
the latter approximated in logari thmic form by "' i=log(Wi/wNl .  to be 
measured in percentage points, as wel l  as cross-product terms l ike, 
e . g .  "' i/� . Lagged dependent variables are also included. since 
9 • See Appendix 2 for sources and definit ions of all variables. 
10 When we did not make this correction the econometric results 
-available from us on request- were not very different from those 
reported below. 
1 1  This procedure was suggested to us by Richard Layard and Stephen 
Nickel 1. 
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migration f lows exhibit considerable inertia, 12 and because these 
variables might proxy for the stock of migrants from other regions. 
As a first check of the chance that unemployment and wage 
differentials have in explaining the downward path of migration, we 
should recall that relative unemployment rates have in fact converged 
over time, as revealed by the regional mismatch index computed above . 
As stated before, the same is not true for absolute differentials of 
unemployment rates, as is evident from Table 5 ,  which reports dUi for 
1962-86 and two subsamples. As to real wage different ials, the table 
also reports the values of wi . A synthetic answer about the i r  evolution 
is given by the fol lowing index of wage inequality: 
[ 16]  
The larger the index, the more different are regional wages, and 
if all wages are the same the index is equal to zero. Figure 1 4  plots 
the index across regions. Inequality was relatively high in the early 
1960s, but has been coming down since, except for 1980-84. This is 
partly explained by a generalised fall in wage dispersion since the 
early 1970s -as Dolado and Halo de Holina ( 1985) stress for industry­
due , in the second half of the 1970s, to a new system of nationwide 
wage agreements. Garcia ( 1988) reports a 277. fall in dispersion across 
. 1 3  sectors and a 17% fall across occupations. 
In order to provide more descriptive measures, Table 6 contains the 
sample correlation coefficients among the previous variables in the 
short run (changes ) and the long run ( leve ls ) .  We observe small 
correlations in the short run and larger ones in the long run, but in 
both cases the signs are the expected ones according to the mode l .  
Regional dummy variables have been included i n  the set of 
regressors, to al low for different fixed effects on migration rates, 
12 Probably exacerbated by our adjustment of the official data. 
13 Fina ( 1987) remarks that these numbers should be taken with caution, 
due to a methodological break in the series. 
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TABLE 5 
MIGRATION, WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY REGION 
(Averages i n  percer'lages) 
Region Year m .  d u o  ru. W .  1 1 1 1 
1962-86 -0 . 49 4 . 1 1  2 .  1 1  -20 . 62 
AND 1962-75 -0 . 83 2 . 47 4 1 2  -23 . 30 
1976-86 -0.02 6 . 1 8 1 . 59 -17 . 1 9 
1962-86 -0 . 1 3 -1 . 8 8  0 . 62 -2 . 57 
ARA 1962-75 -0 . 26 -0.76 0 . 8 9  -1 . 06 
1976-86 0 . 03 -3 . 3 1  0 . 73 -4 . 49 
1962-86 --0 . 07 -1 . 47 0 . 69 1 1 . 2 2 
AST 1962-75 -0.07 -0 . 64 1 .  01 1 4 . 3 5 
1976-86 -0 . 0 7  -2 . 53 0 . 8 1  7 . 24 
1962-86 0 . 1 3 -2 . 54 0 . 4 5  - 1  . 6 8  
BAl 1962-75 O . lS -1 . 2 4 0 . 4 1  1 . 43 
1 976-86 0 . 09 -4 . 1 9  0.·70 -5 6' 
1962-86 0 . 1 3  1 . 1 1  1 . 03 - 1 1  . 14 
CAN 1962-75 0 . 1 2 -0. 32 1 . 3 3 -9 . 4 2  
1976-86 0 . 1 5 2 93 1 .  3 1  -1 3 .  3 4  
1962-86 --0 . 06 -2.06 0 . 59 5 57 
CNT 1962-75 0 . 1 1  -0 . 74 0 . 9 1 8 . 24 
1976-86 0 . 00 -3 , 73 0 . 72 2 . 1 7 
1962-86 -0 . 82 -1 . 3 3 0 . 6 7 -25 . 5 5  
ClM 1962-75 - 1 . 3 3 -0.65 1 . 00 -24 62 
1976-86 -0 . 1 6 -2 . 1 9 0 . 8 8 -26 . 73 
1962-86 -0 . 49 -1 . 29 0 . 7 1 - 4 . 8 8  
CL( 1962-75 --0 . 79 -0 . 6 1 1 . 04 -3 . 00 
1 976-86 -0 . 1 1  -2 . I S  0 . 8 S 7 . 27 
1962-86 O .  72 0 . 00 0 . 8 6 6 . 1 7 
CAT 1 962-75 1 . 3 2 --0 . 52 1 .  1 3  6 . 53 
1976-86 -0 04 0 . 67 1 . 0 1  5 . 73 
1962-86 0 . 47 - 0 . 25 0 . 6 3  1 0 . 90 
PVA 1962-75 1 . 03 -1 . 14 0 . 5 1 1 5 . 95 
1 916-86 -0 . 25 0 . 88 1 . 06 4 . 48 
1 9 62-86 --0 . 90 1 .  88 1 . 36 -30 . 32 
EXT 1 962-75 - 1 . 58 0 . 57 2 . 22 -33 . 0 7  
1 9 76-86 -0.05 ) , 56 1 . 36 -26 . 8 3 
1 9 62-86 -0 . 1 3 -3 . 34 0 . 4 7 -3 . 4 1  
GAL 1962-75 -0 . 20 -0.80 0 . 85 -5 . 57 
1 976-86 -0 . 02 -6 . 58 0 . 47 -0 . 66 
1962-86 0 . 52 0 . 2 1  .05 1 6  3 2  
MAD 1 962-75 0 . 83 0.05 . 70 1 7  9 4  
1 976-86 0 . 1 3 0 . 42 .09 1 4 .  26 
1962-86 -0.05 0 . 10 1 . 3 7  - 1 8  . 4 4  MUR 1 9 62-75 -0 . 2 1  1 .  17 2 82 -19 . 8 3  
1 9 76-86 0 . 1 3  -1 . 25 0 9 3  - 1 6  . 6 7  
1962-86 O .  22 -1 . 26 O .  60 -. SS 
NAV 1 9 62-75 O .  30 -0 . 92 0 7 3  -2 . 44 
1 9 76-86 O .  1 3  -1 . 69 O .  8 8  -7 . 25 
1 962-86 0 . 03 -2 . 6 1  0 . 3 8 -8 . 50 lRJ 1 962-75 -{) . 14 -1 . 30 0 . 3 5 -10 . 1 3 
1 976-86 0 . 2 4 -4 . 28 0 . 60 -6 . 4 2  
1962-86 0 . 45 -0 . 65 0 . 90 -8 . 0 1  
VAl 1 9 62-75 0 . 69 -0.20 1 . 46 -9 . 00 
1976-86 0 . 1 4 -1 . 23 0 . 89 -6 . 77 
£\m .  0", .  
, , 
0 . 04 
&, . 0", . 1 I ,-
0 . 05 
m .  (d .  I , 
0 . 52 
.. . "\-1 I 
0 . 98 
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TABLE 6 
Sample Correlat i on Coe f f i c ients 
( 1 964- 1 9 8 6 )  
Short-Run (Change s )  
0", . 1 IIdu .  
lIdu . 1 IIru. ,- , ,- , 
-{) . 13 -{) . 04 -0 . 02 -{) . 09 
lIdu . lId u .  1 IIpa i , , -
0 . 01 0 . 1 3 -0 . 01 
Long,-Run (Lev e l s )  
(0
\ _ 1  du o du .  1 ru . , , - , 
0 . 51 -0 . 1 3 -0 . 1 3 -{) . 26 
d u o  d u o  pai , ,-I 
0 . 04 0 . 10 0 . 15 
IIru. 1 ,- IIpai 
-{) . 03 -{) . OO  
rU i _ 1 pa. i 
-{) . 24 -0 . 10 
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introducing a different constant for each region. Through these 
variables we expect to capture a l l  the subset of variables in Zi which 
have not changed systematically during the sample, l ike the weather or 
the relative degree of urbanisat ion. 
To take into account the different moving and l iving costs in 
different regions, we deflate the nominal wage in each region by the 
regional retail price index, so that relative wages are real ones. 
Since finding housing in the region of destination seems of paramount 
importance in the migration decision, we have also included the 
relative different ial between each region' s housing ( own imputed and 
rental )  price index (PAi l and the nationwide index (P� l ,  in the 
logarithmic form pai=log ( PAi/P� ) ,  A significant coefficient on this 
variable would signal that migrants give it an importance exceeding its 
share in the overall retail price index. We expect a negative effect of 
this variable. 
To consider potent ial effects of the employment composition in the 
migration decision. we included a variable measuring the proportion 
represented by the building sector in each region' s total employment. 
I t  has been noted ( e .  g. Fina ( 1987 ) )  that construction provided the 
transi t ion for migrants from agricultural regions when they moved to 
the ci ties. A drop in this variable would make migration harder, so we 
expect a positive sign on this variable. Some researchers suggest that 
employment growth captures employment opportuni ties better than the 
unemployment rate, so we also tried to include in the regression the 
relative employment growth in a region. 
The possib i l ity of having a non-l inear u t i l i ty function in [ 6 J ,  such 
that W1 and b ( l-ci l are substi tuted by V[Wi ] and V [b ( l-ci l ] ,  with V' >O 
and V" <O, has been considered by adding a 3-year moving average of the 
standard deviations of regional and unemployment rates, which would 
have a negative effect if risk aversion exists. 
Finally, we have used two t ime dummy drift effects, to capture 
specific events. The first one, DEUR, taking on a zero valUe before 
1976 and unity afterwards, tries to capture the effects of economic 
opportuni t ies of migration to European countries. If internal migration 
was an intermediate step towards external migration, we would expect a 
negative sign on this variable. The second dummy variable, DPV, is 
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defined as DEUR but just for the Basque Country. I t  tries to capture 
political events in that region, which may have induced an outflow of 
migrants above that explained by purely economic factors. 
Since the regressors are potentially endogenous we est imated both by 
instrumental variables �using two lags of each variable as instruments­
and by three-stage least squares. The corresponding Hausman tests for 
endogenei ty of the contemporaneous regressors were never significant 
and the results were very similar to ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates, so the latter are presented in order to simplify the 
computation of tests. Due to the use of two lags, the effective 
estimation period is 1964-1986 and the corresponding number of 
observations is 391 .  
The selected specificat ion of the pooled regression, whose 
encompassing test of the unrestricted equation ( 1 .  e.  al lowing for 3 
coefficients per variable, plus cross-terms ) is F ( 30, 341 ) =0. 98 (5r. 
critical value=1 . 46 )  , appears in the first block of Table 7. Only 10 
of the 17 shift dummies were signif icant at the 10% leve l ,  the 
remaining were excluded from the final specification. The regression 
-2 fits very well (R =0. 98 in the equivalent regression with mit as the 
dependent variable) and the pooling restrict ions ( i . e.  that all regions 
have the same coeff icients) are accepted at conventional significance 
levels (FP test in the table ) .  
However, some of the individual equations, reported in Appendix 3, 
do not fit very well ( in particular, AST and CAN) or have wrong signs, 
revealing some heterogeneity across regions. However, most of the wrong 
2 signs are associated to insignificant variables and the low R s are 
associated with regions where l i ttle migration flows have occurred. 
Moreover, of the 51 level coefficients corresponding to relative 
unemployment and wages, and housing differentials ( i . e . �6' �7 and �8 ) ' 
43 were correctly signed, so we feel reasonably confident about the 
homogeneity of the chosen spec ification across regions. There is no 
indication of first order autocorrelation, and sl ight signs of 
heteroskedasticity, as evidenced by the value of White' s ( 1982) test. 
We report both ordinary t-ratios ( in parenthesis) and 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios ( in brackets ) ;  al though their 
levels vary, the implications of both sets of t-ratios are similar. We 
1 .  Net Migrations 
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TABLE 7 
REGRESSIONS 
(Pool ing) 
6 mi t= 0 . 02+0 . 42 6 mit_l-o . 16 mit_l+O . 20 6 � i t-o . 59 6 .�i t_l-o . 06 6 ru i t  
( 3 . 07 ) ( 1 6 . 3 1 )  ( 1 6 . 30 )  ( 1 . 61 )  ( 4 . 25) ( 2 . 73 )  
[3 . 00 ] [ 1 2 . 03 ]  [ 1 4 . 08] [ 1 . 47] [5 . 24 ]  [2 . 67] 
-0 . 14 rUit_1+O . 04 (�it/UNt )_l-O . 02 (pait/uNt )-O . 077 DPV-4 . 14 AST 
( 1 0 . 04 )  ( 4 . 46 )  ( 2 . 3 3 )  ( 2 . 90) ( 2 . 05 )  
[ 1 5 . 86] [ 4 . 07] [ 2 . 40] [ 3 . 46] [3 . 01 ]  
- 4 . 9B BAL + 2 . 3 4  CAN - 3 . 06 CNT - 5 . B3 CLM - 6 . 61 CLE 
( 2 . 4B )  ( 1 . 1 6 )  ( 1 . 60) ( 2 . 90 )  ( 3 . 3 5 )  
[2 . 6 1 ]  [ 1 . 43 ]  [2 . 00] [2 . 40] [2 . B 1 ]  
+3 . 20 MUR + 3 . 50 NAV + 3 . 77 VAL 
( 1 . 65 )  ( 1 . 90 )  ( 1 . B3 )  
[ 2 . 25] [ 1 . 68] [ 2 . 87] 
- 2 . 60 GAL 
( 1 . 35 )  
[2 . 57] 
N = 3 9 1 ,  R2 = 0 . 72 ,  OW = 1 . 9 6 ,  se = 0 . OB 3 ,  SS = 2 . 5B ,  S K ( 2 )  = 4 . 2B 
FP ( 1 3 4 ,  237) = 0 . 96 [ 1 . 20 ] ,  FHET ( 4 5 ,  3 3 4 )  = 1 . 46 [ 1 . 3 7 ]  
2 .  Waqe s 
� i t=O · 03+0 . 1 4 6 �it_1+o . 2B 6 dUit_1+O · 06 dU i t_1-o · 2 3  �it_1+O · 02 pait-1 
( 6 . 1 9 ) ( 4 . 62 )  ( 2 . 72 )  ( 1 2 . 2 1 )  ( 10 . l B )  ( 2 . 26 )  
[6 . 80 ] [4 . 40] [2 . 68 ]  [9 . H] [9 . 43 ]  [2 . 36] 
-B . 32 AND-4 . 0B ARA-l . 22 AST-3 . 1 9 BAL-5 . B5 CAN-2 . 10 CNT-9 . 49 CLM 
( B . 24 )  ( 5 . 94 )  ( 2 . 30) ( 4 . 3 2 )  ( 6 . 6S) ( 3 . 6 1 )  ( B . 52) 
[7 . B 3 ]  [6 . 3 3 ]  [2 . 3 7 ]  [4 . 09] [6 . 5 1 ]  [3 . 65] [8 . 25] 
-4 . 62 CLE-l . 7B CAT-o . 96 PVA-l 1 . 06 EXT-3 . S5 GAL-7 . 69 MUR-4 . 90 NAV 
(6 . 24 )  ( 3 . 00) ( 1 . 76 )  (9 . 1 1 )  ( 4 . B6 )  ( 7 . 90 )  ( 6 . 86 )  
[6 . S0] [4 . 10] [2 . 44] [8 . 74] [ S . 1 3 ]  [ 7 . 9 3 ]  [7 . 08 ]  
-5 . 05 LRJ-4 . 20 VAL 
( 6 . 24 )  ( S . OS) 
[S . 7B] [5 . 3 7 ]  
N = 3 9 1 ,  R2 = 0 . 44 ,  OW = 2 . 1 7 ,  s e  = 0 . 01 7 ,  S S  = 0 . 1 14 ,  S K ( 2 )  = 2 . S7 
FP (BO, 2B9) = 0 . 9 1 [ 1 . 27 ] ,  FHET ( l S , 3S9) = 1 . 6 1 [ 1 . 67] 
DW :  
SQ : 
ss : 
SK : 
FP ( .  , . ) : 
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no . of observations 
coefficient of multiple correlation ( corrected by 
d .  f . )  
Durbin-Watson stat i . t i c  
Standard deviation o f  the residual. 
Sum of squared residuals 
Jarque " Sera ' .  test of norma l ity ( d i stributed as 
chi-square with 2 d . f . )  
F-Poo l i ng  Encompas ing te.t ( i n  brackets 51 c . v . ) 
FHET ( . ,  . ) :  White ' s  F-Heteroskedasticy test ( i n  brackets 51 c . v . )  
The ord inary t·-ratios appear in parenthes i s  whi ls t  White ' s  
heteroskedast icity cons istent t-ratios appear in bracket • .  
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di scuss below the possible origin o f  a non-constant variance. 
In order to avoid perfect coll inearity with the constant term, the 
dummy variable corresponding to Madrid (HAD) has been excluded, so that 
the fixed effects are interpreted as deviations from the inflow rate in 
Madrid. There is some association between the dummy coeff icients and 
the weather: regions with warm weather (CAN, HUR, VAL) tend to have 
significant posit ive constants above HAD (except BAL ) .  A relationship 
with the degree of urbanisation is also present, capturing a marginally 
significant posit ive constant in the case of NAV and VAL, among the 
regions with big cities, while PVA and CAT do not differ from HAD. 
The response of net migration to changes in wage and unemployment 
different ials reveal some interesting patterns. Interregional migration 
rates respond significantly to wage and unemployment different ials in a 
permanent way, but the response is smal l ,  rather slow and affected by 
the general level of unemployment, the latter confirming the hypothesis 
advanced by Bentol i l a  and Blanchard ( 1990 ) .  In particular, the (wi/� ) 
and (pai/uN ) terms completely dominated the wi and 
respectively. The est imated wage effect implies that if 
pal terms, 
in a given 
region wages rise by IX above the national average, annual migration 
into the region rises by 0. 002 of IX of the region' s population in the 
14 short run, and by 0. 0025/� of IX in the long run. Thus , the influence 
of changes in the region' s relative wage depends in the long run on the 
overall level of unemployment, the response being larger in times of 
low unemployment than in times of high unemployment. So, for example, 
at 10X national unemployment, the inflow in response to a IX favourable 
relat ive wage is in the long run 0. 025 of IX of the region' s 
population, while at 20X national unemployment the effect is halved. 
The discouraging effect of the level of national unemployment in the 
long run but not the short run may be interpreted as fol lows: when 
taking a migration decision agents only consider their region' s 
relative wage, whi le in the long run, once they get information from 
their predecessors about the difficulties of getting a job in other 
1 4  
and 
In the estimation, mit is in percentage terms while 
wage variables are proportions; we do this in 
coefficients with two digits. 
the unemployment 
order to write 
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regions, when the nationwide unemployment rate is high. they discount 
the relative wage rate and their response is · consequently lowered. 
With respect to unemployment effects, · we again f ind confirmation of 
the depressing effect of general unemployment, since both in the short 
and the long run it is relative unemployment what seems to matter. 
Since relat ive unemployment rates may be written as: 
[ 17 )  
having (ui/� ) as a regressor i s  equivalent to assuming that the 
coefficient on the difference (ui-� ) is inversely proportional to �: 
when national unemployment rises, the response of net migration to 
unemployment differences fal ls.  Numerically, at 10% national 
unemployment. a 1 percentage point rise In a region' s unemployment rate 
leads to an outflow of 0. 006 of 1� of the region' s population while in 
the long run the effect is 0 . 09 of 1�.  As in the effect of relative 
wages, when the national unemployment rises to ZO�, the effect is 
halved. Comparing the long-run responses of net migration to wages and 
unemployment differentials, we f ind evidence that the response is 
(about four times) larger to unemployment , which has important 
implications for the design of a sensible regional policy, as discussed 
below. 
As for the remaining explanatory variables, we were only able to 
f ind a small effect with respect to relative housing prices, scaled by 
�. A 1 �  increase in such a variable for a region leads to a net 
outflow of O. OOOZ/� of 1� of the region' s population in the short run, 
and of 0. 001Z5/� of 1 �  in the long run. None of the variables proxying 
for risk aversion, employment structure, employment growth or European 
opportunities were significant. Contemporaneous and lagged effects were 
tried, with the corresponding tests being non significant in every 
case: F(Z, 369 ) =0. 65, 0. 46, 0. 83 for the variance of wages and 
employment, and the bui lding sector variable, respectively, and 
F ( 1 , 370)=1 . Z6 for DEUR, all well below their respective 5� critical 
values. Only the DPV dummy was significant, account ing for a relative 
fall of 7. 7� of annual migration in the Basque Country start ing from 
1976. 
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�ince, as stated before, the behaviour of net migration changes 
after 1975, i t  is important to check the stabi l i ty of the equation. We 
thus reestimate the equation for two subsamples, 1964-75 and 1976-86, 
and test for coefficient instabi l i ty. The two subsample regressions are 
reported in Table 8. The corresponding Chow test does not reject 
stab i l i ty at the 5% level,  though it is noticeable that two 
coeffic ients suffer shifts. The coeff icient on (Wi/� ) is not 
signif icant in the second subsample, implying the absence of a 
permanent effect on net migrations after 1975, with unemployment taking 
the sole role as explanatory variable. This is in agreement with the 
diminishing role of relative wages as resource al location mechanisms, 
as mentioned above . The pai coefficient also shifts, reflecting an 
increasing effect on migration of the widening housing price 
differentials. The last column in Table 8 presents the estimation of 
the migration equation wi thout the lagged wage level,  with the 
remaining coefficients hardly changing, which is used for simulation 
exercises below. 
There are also strong downward shifts in the CLM and VAL dummies, 
and a l l  excluded dummy variables were again not significant in ei ther 
subsample.  Since heteroskedasticity tests do not reveal any problems in 
ei ther subsample we conclude that the heteroskedasticity present in the 
full sample is mostly due to the change in the wage and housing price 
coefficients. 
Regional wage equation 
The second question that we analyse is the extent to which regional 
wage and unemployment different ials persist. We want to emphasise from 
the start that we do not pretend to have a complete model of regional 
wage determination. The latter issue has been studied in depth by 
several authors (e. g. Cowling and Hetcalf ( 1967) for the UK and 
Rodriguez ( 1988 ) and references therein for Spain) . The common view is 
that local supply and demand condit ions only play a l imited role in the 
determination of regional wages. Our being able to explain just over 
40% of the variance of changes in wages -conditioning only on shift 
dummies and unemployment and housing price different ials- seems to 
agree with that view. In particular, we do not control for employment 
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TABLE 8 
MIGRATION 
SubsamEl i! s  
variable 1964 - 75 1 9 7 6  - 86 
const 0 . 02 0 . 03 
( 2 . 00 )  ( 2 . 7 B )  
11 mit-l 0 . 4 3 0 3 4  ( 1 1 . 9 7 )  ( 6  4 7 )  
mit-l -0 . 1 7 -0 . 2 1  ( 1 2 . 6 1 )  ( 7 . 3 B )  
l1 w i  t O .  1 1  0 . 3 2 (0 40) ( 2 . 1 2 )  
II Wit-l -o . 5B -o . 5B ( 2 . 1 5 )  ( 3 . BO )  
Cl rUi t  -0 . 05 -0 . 0 7  ( 1 . 80 )  ( I .  B B )  
rU i t_l -0 . 1 4 -0 . 1 3 ( 5 . 7 8 )  ( 7 . 1 7 )  
Wit-l/UNt-l 0 . 04 0 . 02 ( 3 . 50 )  ( 0 . 7 5 )  
pait/uNt -0 . 02 - 0 . 07 ( 1 .  74 ) ( 1 .  7 0 )  
AST -6 . 62 -3 . 00 
( 1 .  B 6 )  ( 1  . 1 9 )  
BAl -4 . 42 -6 . 4 5 
( 1 .  3 6 )  ( 2  . 54 )  
CAN 1 .  2 3  4 6 4  
( 0 . 3 B )  ( 2  . 0 3 )  
CNT -5 . 70 -2 . 00 
( 1 . 7 7 )  ( 0 . B 5 )  
CLM - 10 . 0B -3 . 00 
( 3 . 05 )  ( 1 . 2 7 )  
ClE - 1 2 . 1 B - 2  . 6 6 
( 3 . 6 B )  ( 1 .  1 5  ) 
PVA -<J . 9 7 -9 . b 7 
( 0 . 30) ( 3  . 7 3 ) 
GAL -3 . 50 -2 . 5B 
( 1  . 1 3  ) ( 1  . 1 3 )  
MUR 3 .  1 4  4 .  1 1  
( 1 . 09 )  ( 1  . 70 )  
NAV 4 . 70 2 .  7 4  
( I. 6 0 )  ( 1  . 1 6 ) 
VAl 7 . 57 1 . 02 
( 2 . 1 0 )  ( 0 .  4 4 )  
-----
N 204 1 B 7  
�� 0 . 094 0 . 06 B  0 . 74 0 . 6 B 
DW O .  B5 2 . 07 
SK ( 2 )  3 . B6 3 . 02 
FH<T I .  3 6  [ I .  3 5 ]  1 . 1 6  
FCH ( 2 2 , 3 5 1 ) = 1 . 2 4  [ 1 . 5 7] 
Not e :  A s  i n  Table 7 .  FCH: Chow ' s  F-Sta b i l ity test . 
[ 1 . 3 5 ]  
1 9 7 6  - 8 6  
0 . 02 
( 2 . 7 2 )  
O .  3 1  
( 6 .  7 7 )  
-0 . 20 
( B .  2 6 )  
0 . 3 0 
( 2 . 00 )  
-0 . 55 
( 3 . 7 3 )  
-0 . 07 
( I . B B )  
-0 . 1 3  
( B .  2 6 )  
-0 . 07 
( I .  B 4 )  
-2 . 1 1  
( 0 . 9 4 )  
-6 . 5 1 
( 2 . 5 7 )  
4 . 3 4 
( 1 .  9 2 )  
- 1 .  4 7  
( 0 . 6 6 )  
- 3 . 3 7  
( 1 . 4 6 ) 
-2 . 3 4  
( 1 0 3 )  
-B . 9 9 
( 3 . 75 )  
-2 . 2 6 
( 1 . 0 1 )  
3 . 5 1 
( 1 .  5 5 )  
2 . 50 
( 1  . 1 1 )  
0 . 6 7 
( 0 . 3 0 )  
1 B 7  
0 . 068 
0 . 6 B 
2 . 05 
2 . 9 9 
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composition across regions, whi le in his study Rodriguez ( 1988) 
concludes that interprovincial nominal wage differentials in Spain are 
to a large extent due to the specialisation of southern regions in 
low-wage sectors. 
The OLS regression model results for the change in relative wages is 
reported in the second block of Table 7. Contrary to the case of 
migration, most shift dummies are very significant,. with AND, CLM, EXT 
and MUR well below the relative growth in HAD and AST, CNT and PVA 
around the same growth as in HAD, which is the highest. This is 
possibly related to the composition of employment across regions: the 
regions corresponding to the first four dummies are all in the South of 
Spain, those associated to the latter three dummies are in the North. 
The pooling and the remaining parameter restrictions pass at the 5% 
leve l ,  and there are no signs of either first-order autocorrelation or 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
There are two non-competing hypothesis to test. The first is a 
short-run one, the Phill1ps curve view by which as desired employment 
increases employers raise wages to attract more labour, i . e. a negative 
relationship between unemployment and changes in wages, in our case 
between variables which are relative to the national mean. We were not 
able to capture this effect in nei ther the full sample nor the second 
subsample, with only small favorable evidence in the first subsample 
(see below ) .  The positive coefficients on the level and the differences 
of relative unemployment seemingly imply that the mere rise in actual 
employment, in spite of the fall in wages, is sufficient for employers 
in order to attract labour. Though the simple correlations in Table 6 
point in the same direction, we believe this not to be a satisfactory 
feature but, since data on the many other variables which may influence 
regional wages were not available to us -and the statistical 
performance of the equation is fairly correct- we keep it as Is. 
The other hypothesis concerns expected wage equal isation. In the 
long run, with perfect labour mobi l ity and in the absence of risk 
aversion or other variables. expected. returns would equalise across 
regions, i . e .  Ri = �, with Ri as in [61 . Since Ri�= l ,  In(Ri� )=O, 
and the long-run condit ion reads: 
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Making use of the approximation ln [ l - ( 1-b)u. l " - ( 1 -b ) u  and the 
_�' i functional assumption ( l -ci ) ! ( l-CN) = (PAilP� ) , we get: 
[ 19 ]  
If there were no unemployment benef its, expected wages would 
equal ise across regions, whereas if the unemployment compensation were 
100% of the wage rate, then the expected return, apart from moving 
costs, would be equal to the wage rate, hence i t  would be wage rates 
that tend to be equal:  wi=WNo In between there i s  a continuum of cases 
indexed by b, giving rise to a positive relation between the region' s 
relative wage (wi!WN) and the relative unemployment level.  ui-�' with 
a coefficient possibly different from unity. 
Another possibi l i ty of gett ing a coefficient different from unity 
arises if factors such as risk aversion play a role, causing some 
non-l inearity in the expected returns from moving or staying. It is, 
however , possible to sho� under simple assumptions, l ike having a 
concave constant relative risk aversion (CRRA ) ut i l ity function, that 
the tradeoff between the unemployment differential on the 
relative wage In(w/wN ) would be larger than unity. In this sense, we 
expect to be able to discriminate between the l inear ut i l ity cum 
replacement ratio hypothesis and the concave CRRA ut i l i ty hypothesis, 
by examining the size of the est imated slope coefficient. 
In our est imates there is a well defined, albeit sma l l ,  posit ive 
relationship between a region' s relative wage and its unemployment 
differential. Regions with above-average unemployment will  tend to 
have , in the long run, above-average wages. So wages eventually 
compensate for differences in unemployment, but at the rate 0. 3: 1 .  The 
restriction that the coefficients of the two level terms are equal in 
absolute value is clearly rejected ( t-ratio=8. 03 ) .  To be precise, we 
find that in a long-run steady state relative wages,  in deviation of 
their drifts and their relative moving costs, are a f ixed proportion of 
relative unemployment rates. Making all first difference terms equal to 
zero, the long-run solution yields: 
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( 1= 1 ,  . . .  , 17 ) [20J 
where Dr is the long-run value of the i-th dummy and we have used the 
same approximation as in [ 19 J . 
Hence our estimates imply that in the short run ,wages do not respond 
to above-average unemployment [ recall that the contemporaneous value of 
ui does not appear in the regression ) while in the long run, if a 
region has, on average, 1 percentage point of unemployment above the 
national level, its wage rate would be 0. 3X above the average rate for 
the country as a whole. According to our discussion of [ 19 J  this 
implies an estimated replacement ratio of 0 . 7,  which fits reasonably 
well with the scanty evidence we have about the sample average of this 
variable. For example, Dolado et al.  ( 1986) construct its time series 
for industrial workers, obtaining a sample mean of 0. 67 for 1966-86, 
with a range going from 0. 61 at the beginning of the sample to 0. 75 at 
its end. To examine the hypothesis of risk aversion we included as 
extra regressors the standard deviations of 
employment rates, but both were insignificant. 
regional wage and 
This gives us some 
confidence that the replacement ratio hypotheSis provides a better 
15 interpretation of the evidence. 
It should be noted that, as in the migration equation, convergence 
to the long-run equilibriUm is slow. For example, if a given region' s 
relative wage is lX above the national average, ceteris paribus, this 
will lead, in the following year to a 0. 28 of lX decline in the 
region' s relative wage rate, 0. 20 of lX in the second year, 0 . 1 7  of lX 
in the third year and so on, until the original deviations are 
eliminated. ' Finally, we find a positive effect of relative rental 
housing prices on relative wages, such that in the short run, if a 
region' s housing price index is lX above the national average, its real 
wage rate would tend to be 0. 02 of lX above the nationwide average, 
whilst such effect is 0. 1 of lX in the long run. 
1 5  We decided against including the replacement ratio 
the migration equation as a regressor, because we feel 
the constructed measure is too low. 
in the wage or 
the quality of 
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As with the migration equation, we estimate the wage equation in the 
two subsamples 1964-75 and 1976-86. The results are presented in Table 
9. Apart from the coefficients on the lagged changes of wages and of 
unemployment different ials the remaining ones do not change much, and 
the Chow test of parameter stabi l i ty is easily passed at the 5% level.  
The pool ing restrictions are again not rejected, but we found that in 
the first subsample the contemporaneous value of the unemployment 
differential was negative with a t-ratio of 1 . 62 (not reported ) .  This 
may point to a short-run Phi l l ips curve effect being present in that 
subsample, an effect not found at all in the second subsample. The 
individual equations (see Appendix 3 )  show the same picture, with only 
AND and NAV showing some signs of a Phi l l ips effect. 
Regional unemployment equation 
To close the model we need an equation for regional unemployment 
rates. We made several attempts using migration rates and wages, but 
a l l  of them failed. At the end, in order to be operative at the 
simulation stage, we reached a compromise solution by which the 
equation was not est imated but derived as a pseudo-identity, following 
the same approach as in Pissarides and HcHaster ( 1984 ) . 
Just to see what is involved assume that there are no outflows and 
a l l  new immigrants, Hit'  are unemployed during the first year of 
arrival. Then the absolute number of unemployed in region i would be 
Uit = Uit-1 + Hit· Dividing by the population (POP) at t-1 and after 
some simple algebra we can express the unemployment rate as: 
POPit-1 
Lit 
[ 2 1 ]  
With a basically constant labour force -which one gets for Spain 
comparing 1986 with 1 962- and assuming a constant population-labour 
force ratio this could approximately be written as: 
[22] 
- 1  where a i s  the labour force-population ratio. Guided by the sample 
lIar-iable 
const 
11 w i t-l 
11 dUi t-l 
Io)it-l 
dUit_l 
pait-l 
AND 
ARA 
AST 
BAL 
CAN 
CNT 
CLI1 
CLE 
CAT 
PVA 
EXT 
GAL 
MUR 
NAV 
LRJ 
VAL 
• 
SS 
�� 
DW 
FHET 
- 5 0 -
TABLE 9 
WAGES 
Subsa.m�h s 
1964 - 75 
0 . 04 
( 4 . 68 )  
0 . 2 5 
(4 . 90 )  
0 . 5 1 
( 1 .  52) 
-0 . 2 7 
( 6 . 5 1 )  
0 . 05 
( 6 . 75) 
0 . 03 
( 1 .  60) 
- 10 . 94 
• ( 5 . 8 4 )  
- 4  98 
(4 . 66 )  
- 1 .08 
( 1 .  50) 
- 4 . 3 3  
( 3 . 9 5 )  
-7 . 1 1 
( 4 . 80 )  
-2 . 78 
( 3 . 3 B )  
- 1 0 . 8 8  
( 5 . 47 )  
-5 58 
( 4 .  77) 
- 2 .  70 
( 3  . 1 1 )  
-0 . 8 3  
( 1 . 1 7 )  
- 1 3 . 8S 
( 6 . 05 )  
-S . 4 3 
( 4 . 20 )  
-9 . 1 4 
( 4 . 9 1 )  
-5 . 6B 
( 5 . 1 5 )  
-6 . 74 
( 4 . 52 )  
- S . 77 
( 3 . 8 8 )  
204 
0 . 053 
0 . 0 1 7  
0 . 0\2 
2 . 1 6 
0 . 8 3  [ 1 . 8 3 ]  
FCH ( 2 2 . 3 4 7 )  = 1 . 3 5  [ 1 . 55] 
Note :  As in Table 7 and Table 8 .  
1976 - 86 
0 . 05 
( 5 . 1 6 )  
0 . 1 4  
( 3 . 06 )  
0 . 2 8 
( 2 . 49 )  
-0 . 35 
( 6 . 9 1 )  
0 . 07 
( 8 . 1 6 )  
0 01 
(I . 1 5 )  
- 10 . 74 
( 5 . 92 )  
-6 . IS 
( 4 . 95 )  
-2 . 26 
( 2 . 72 )  
-5 . 43 
( 4 . 00) 
-9 . 42 
( 6 . 0 2 )  
-3 . 10 
( 2 . 97 )  
- 1 4 . 3 7 
( 6 . 49 )  
-7 . 16 
( 5 . 2 3 )  
-2 . 65 
( 2  . 8 4 )  
-2 . 40 
( 2 .  5 8 )  
- 14 . 73 
( 6  4 9 )  
-4 . 6 1  
( 3  . 9 8 )  
- 1 1 . 00  
( 6 . 22) 
-7 . 2 1  
( 5 . 3 9 )  
-6 . 90 
( 5 . 03 )  
-6 . 73 
( 4 . 9 3 )  
181 
0 . 052 
0 . 0 1 8  
0 . 48 
2 . 26 
1 . 02 [ I . B 3 ]  
-- 5 1  -
value of this ratio, around 0. 4,  and realizing that assuming full 
unemployment for the migrants is an extreme, we chose for a the value 
of 1 . 5  ( in fact 0. 015, recal l  that we use mi in percentage terms but 
not ui ) ,  which would correspond to 60% of migrants being unemployed 
during the first year in the simplified case above . Given that the wage 
changes in the simulations below are smal l ,  we feel some confidence 
about the order of magnitude chosen. Experimentation with values around 
0. 01 in the simulat ions below only changed the results sl ightly, giving 
in any case a stable path of the system towards the long-run 
compensating equil ibrium between wages and unemployment rates. For 
example, taking the long-run coefficients derived from the est imated 
migration and wage equations for the total sample with ��15% we would 
have, abstracting from constants and housing prices: 
m .  1 .  67 wi - 5. 83 ui (
+ terms in l1wi , l1ui , l1mi ) [23a] 1 
Wi 
� 0. 21 u .  1 (
+ terms in l1wi , l1ui ) [23b] 
l1u. � 0. 015 1 m. 1 [23c] 
Ignoring short-term changes and substi tuting the first two equations 
into the third the evolution of ui is be guided by an AR O ) process 
wi th a root of 0. 92, whereas if the parameter in the unemployment 
16 equation was 0. 01 the coefficient would be 0. 95, also stable. Notice 
that the process by which the regional unemployment rates tend to be 
equalised ( in deviations from drifts and housing prices) is quicker the 
lower the level of overall unemployment. For instance, if � was 7. 5%, 
then the root of the AR ( l )  process would be 0 . 89, greatly reducing the 
length of the adjustment. In order to analyse more precisely the 
pattern of adjustment , and the concomitant role of regional policy, we 
devote the next section to a properly dynamiC simulation of the model .  
16 I f  short-term differences were included we would get a more general 
AR(p)  process, whose gain at L�l would be ident ical to the previous 
values, giving a similar picture of the adjustment process; see Wickens 
and Breusch ( 1988 ) .  
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3. 4 Simulat ions and regional employment pol icy impl ications 
Our previous empirical findings support the view that: 
( 1 )  net regional migration rates respond nonlinearly to wage and 
unemployment differentials, and 
( i i )  there is a tendency for regional unemployment and wage 
differentials to approach a long-run compensating equi l ibrium in terms 
of deviat ions of their respective drifts and housing prices. 
If the process by which wage and unemployment different ials 
disappear was fast, and there were no differences in drifts and moving 
costs, these f indings would cast doubt on the effect iveness of a 
regional employment policy. The latter could then be defined only in a 
neutral sense: moving Jobs to people or the opposite. 
This conclusion is certainly true in the long run. But according to 
our empirical findings there are significant drifts in wage 
different ials and also the adjustment of migration and wages is slow. 
Regional employment policy might then be able to speed up the process 
of equalisation. We would advocate several types of policies. 
First, measures COUld be taken to encourage jobs to move before 
people do. Some of these policies should give firms more incentives to 
hire more labour in depressed regions, like marginal employment 
subsidies or the lowering of payroll taxes. 17 This would apply to 
regions l ike the Northeast, with relatively -in national terms- high 
unemployment rates and real wages. But labour is al ready cheapest in 
the South, which reveals the lack of other conditions. In particular, 
to be effective, these policies should be complemented by higher 
investment in infrastructure in general, and communications in 
particular, which has been very low in Spain in the recent past (see 
Vifials et al. ( 1990» . In this way, less favoured areas could become an 
attract ive al ternative for the location of firms, which is not the case 
now. 
A second set of polic ies would make i t  economically more profitable 
for people to move, for instance by stepping up the program of 
subsidies for migration established in 1986 and by temporarily 
subsidising housing in target areas, so that housing price 
17 Similar measures have been proposed for the UK by C. Huhne ( 1990 ) .  
- 53 -
differentials would have less of a deterring effect on migration. 
Finally, a third type of policy should aim at variables which in our 
econometric model are the regional dummy variables, i . e . public goods 
and amenities which make i t  more pleasant to l ive in a given area: 
education, health care, cultural events, etc. The distribution of these 
public goods is also quite uneven in Spain, and its improvement could 
provide an important motivation for migration. 
Because geographical disparities have always been sizable, regional 
development policy is an old-age subject in Spain. The classic study is 
Richardson ( 1975 ) ,  and a more recent survey is provided by Martin 
( 1988 ) .  Regional policies have been implemented in the past,  which 
helps account for the convergence of regional GDP per capita over time 
(as shown in Figure 9 ) .  However, the long period of recession, 1975-85, 
brought a large part of the official development policy to a halt. What 
is needed is to take advantage of the economic growth taking place 
today to divert a larger part of those resources into regional 
development policies. In fact, some of the policies we advocate are 
considered in the medium-term regional development plan of the Spanish 
Government for 1989-1993 (Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda ( 1989a , b » , 
but it remains to be seen whether they will  be implemented or not .  One 
should be aware that on these issues there is a nontrivial coordination 
problem between the central government and the 17 regional governments, 
which depends on a stable agreement on the financing of the latter, 
which has s t i l l  not been reached. 
Can the efficiency of these policy proposals be defended 
analyt ically? JLS show that a rigorous case for expected tax 
differentials in favour of high unemployment groups can be made and 
that such differentials should be higher the less responsive is the 
labour force to ·wage inequalities. Since we find low responsiveness and 
slow adjustment to economic incentives, our proposals would meet the 
condit ions required by the theory. 
In order to i l lustrate the role of these policies, we have used the 
estimates of the regional system formed by the migration and wage 
equations to compute the fol lowing simulation. We take as the initial 
state one in which a given region' s unemployment rate is 1 percentage 
point above the national rate -which is kept unchanged at 15%, not an 
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unlikely forecast for 1990- assuming zero drifts and housing price 
different ials. This will  encourage net outmigration unt i l  the 
differential is el iminated. The model is closed by using the proposed 
relation between changes In regional unemployment rates and · net 
migration rates. Since the migration equation shows some signs of 
instabi l i ty,  we have performed the calculation for the total sample and 
the two subsamples. The results are in Table 10 and in Figures 15, 1 6  
and 1 7 .  
I t  is clear that unemployment differentials only vanish very slowly, 
as roughly i l lustrated above by the high root that its autoregresive 
representation would have . In the first subsample, i t  takes 9 years 
after the initial shock for half of the initial shock to di sappear, 
while the corresponding length for the second subsample and the total 
sample is between 1 1  and 9 years, respectively. During the adjustment 
there is continuous outmigration, which reaches a peak 5 or 6 years 
after the initial shock and then declines slowly. Wages also adjust , 
ini tially increasing due to the effect of lagged wages and larger 
unemployment , but fall ing afterwards, as unemployment fal ls. They reach 
a peak in the second year ( first year for the second subsample) and 
then fal l monotonical ly. 
The role of regional employment policy in this example can be 
evaluated by the saving in unemployment points that would happen if the 
initial regional unemployment rate is increased by 1 percentage point. 
This is measured by the sum of the elements in each of the columns 
labelled du in Table 1 0 .  The est imated person-years of unemployment 
would be 10 points for the first subsample, where the adjustment is 
quicker, and between 13 and 16 points for the second subsample and the 
total sample. Given the homogeneity of the system in terms of the 
initial level of unemployment, an initial shock of x percentage points 
to the region' s unemployment differentials will  take between lOx and 
16x percentage points of unemployment , depending on the case, before 
the differential is el iminated. Calculated gains depend negatively on 
the national unemployment rate. For example, if instead of 15" the 
national rate was assumed to be 10", the preceding gains would be 
divided by a factor around 1 .  5.  In other words, at times of high 
unemployment, l ike the present situation, people are less l ikely to 
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FIGURE 16: Regionol System 
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FIGURE 1 7: Regionol System 
Adjustment Path (Second Subsample) 
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TABLE 1 0 :  REGIONAL SYSlUi DYNAM IC ADJUSlMENT PATH 
\/hole samp le First subsample Second subsamp le 
Year m du w 11 du w m du w 
1 -0. 031 0 . 933 0. 333 -0. 039 0 . 918 0 . 556 -0. 034 0. 926 0 . 342 
2 -0. 031 0. 886 0 . 336 -0. 041 0. 857 0 . 561 -0. 036 0. 872 0 . 321 
3 -0. 030 0. 841 0 . 287 -0. 040 0. 797 0 . 4 1 1  -0. 036 0. 8 1 8  0 . 248 
4 -0. 029 0 . 797 0 . 239 -0. 038 0 . 740 0 . 260 -0. 034 0. 767 0. 190 
5 -0. 028 0. 756 0. 202 -0. 037 0. 684 0 . 151 -0. 033 0 . 717 O.  152 
6 -0. 027 0. 7 1 6  0 . 174 -0. 036 0 . 630 0 . 083 -0. 031 0. 671 O.  128 
7 -0. 026 0. 677 0 . 152 -0. 035 0. 578 0 . 044 -0. 030 0 . 626 0 . 1 12 
8 -0. 024 0. 641 0 . 135 -0. 034 0. 527 0 . 022 -0 . 028 0. 584 0. 101  
9 -0. 023 0 . 606 0 . 121 -0. 032 0. 479 0 . 010 -0. 026 0. 545 0. 092 
1 0  -0. 022 0 . 572 0. 1 1 0  -0. 030 0. 434 0 . 003 -0. 025 0. 508 0. 085 
1 1  -0. 021 0. 540 0 . 101 -0. 029 0. 391 -0. 002 -0. 023 0 . 473 0 . 078 
1 2  -0. 020 0. 5 1 0  0 . 093 -0. 027 O .  351 -0. 005 -0. 022 0 . 440 0. 072 
1 3  -0. 019 0 . 481 0 . 086 -0. 025 0 . 314 -0. 008 -0. 020 0. 410 0 . 067 
1 4  -0 . 018 0. 453 0 . 080 -0. 023 0. 279 -0 . 010 -0. 019 0 . 381 0 . 062 
1 5  -0 . 017 0. 427 0 . 075 -0. 021 0 . 248 -0 . 012 -0 . 018 0. 355 0. 058 
1 6  -0 . 016 0 . 402 0 . 070 -0 . 01 9  0. 219 -0 . 0 13 -0 . 017 0. 330 0 . 054 
1 7  -0 . 016 0 . 379 0. 065 -0. 0 1 7  0 . 193 -0 . 013 -0. 015 0. 307 0 . 050 
18 -0 . 015 0. 357 0. 061 -0 . 0 16 0. 170 -0 . 0 13 -0 . 0 14 0 . 285 0 . 046 
1 9  -0 . 014 0. 336 0 . 057 -0. 014 0. 148 -0. 013 -0. 013 0 . 265 0. 043 
20 -0 . 0 13 0. 316 0 . 054 -0. 0 1 3  0. 129 -0 . 01 3  -0. 012 0. 246 0 . 040 
2 1  -0. 012 0 . 297 0 . 050 -0. 0 1 1  0 . 1 1 2  -0. 013 -0. 012 0 . 229 0. 037 
22 -0. 012 0. 280 0. 047 -0 . 01 0  0. 097 -0 . 01 2  -0. 0 1 1  0. 213 0 . 035 
23 -0. 0 1 1  0 . 263 0. 044 -0. 009 0 . 084 -0. 01 1 -0. 010 0 . 198 0 . 032 
24 -0. 010 0. 247 0 . 041 -0. 008 0 . 072 -0 . 01 1  -0. 009 0 . 184 0 . 030 
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25 -0 . 01 0  0 . 232 0. 039 -0. 007 0 . 061 -0. 0 1 0  -0 . 009 O. 171 0. 028 
26 -0. 009 0 . 219 0 . 037 -0. 006 0. 052 -0. 009 -0. 008 0. 159 0. 026 
27 -0. 009 0 . 205 0. 034 -0. 005 0 . 044 -0. 009 -0. 007 0. 148 0. 024 
28 -0. 008 0 . 193 0. 032 -0. 005 0 . 037 -0 . 008 -0. 007 0. 137 0 . 022 
29 -0. 008 0 . 182 0 . 030 -0. 004 0 . 031 -0. 007 -0. 006 0. 128 0. 021 
30 -0. 007 0. 171  0. 028 -0. 004 0 . 026 -0. 007 -0. 006 O. 1 1 9  0. 0 1 9  
3 1  -0. 007 0 . 160 0 . 027 -0. 003 0 . 021 -0 . 006 -0. 006 0. 1 1 0  0 . 018 
32 -0. 006 0. 1 5 1  0 . 025 -0. 003 0 . 017 -0. 005 -0. 005 0. 102 0 . 017 
33 -0. 006 0 . 142 0. 024 -0. 002 0 . 014 -0. 005 -0. 005 0. 095 0 . 0 1 5  
34 -0. 006 0 . 133 0. 022 -0. 002 0 . 01 1  -0. 004 -0. 004 0. 088 0 . 0 1 4  
35 -0. 005 0 . 125 0 . 02 1  -0. 002 0 . 009 -0 . 004 -0. 004 0. 082 0. 0 1 3  
36 -0. 005 0 . 1 17 0. 019 -0. 001  0 . 007 -0. 003 -0. 004 0 . 076 0. 0 1 2  
37 -0. 005 0 . 1 10 0. 018 -0. 001  0. 005 -0. 003 -0. 004 0. 071 0 . 0 1 1  
38 -0. 004 0. 104 0. 017 -0. 001  0 . 004 -0. 003 -0. 003 0 . 066 0 . 0 1 1  
39 -0. 004 0 . 097 0. 016 -0. 001  0 . 003 -0. 002 -0. 003 0 . 061 0. 0 1 0  
40 -0. 004 0. 092 0. 015 -0. 001 0 . 002 -0. 002 -0. 003 0. 057 0. 009 
41 -0. 004 0 . 086 0. 014 -0. 001 0. 001 -0. 002 -0. 003 0. 053 0 . 009 
42 -0. 003 0 . 081 0. 013 0 . 000 0 . 000 -0. 002 -0. 002 0. 049 0 . 008 
43 -0. 003 0. 076 0 . 0 1 3  0. 000 0. 000 -0. 001 -0. 002 0. 046 0. 007 
44 -0. 003 0. 071 0. 012 0 . 000 0 . 000 -0. 001 -0 . 002 0. 042 0. 007 
45 -0. 003 0. 067 0. 0 1 1  0. 000 -0 . 001 -0. 001 -0. 002 0. 039 0. 006 
46 -0. 003 0 . 063 0. 010 0 . 000 -0. 001 -0. 001 -0. 002 0. 037 0 . 006 
47 -0. 003 0. 059 0. 010 0 . 000 -0. 001 -0. 001 -0. 002 0 . 034 0 . 006 
48 -0. 002 0. 055 0. 009 0 . 000 -0. 001 -0. 001 -0. 002 0. 0:;2 0. 005 
49 -0. 002 0. 052 0 . 009 0. 000 -0. 001 -0. 001 -0. 00 1  0 . 029 0. 005 
50 -0. 002 0. 049 0. 008 0. 000 -0. 001 0 . 000 -0. 001 0. 027 0. 004 
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move, and , thus, the role of regional employment policy can be 
substant ial. 
4.  Conclusions 
In this paper we continue the search for the causes of the rise in 
unemployment in Spain. We start by analysing the behaviour of mismatch, 
from two different angles. First we fol low the approach that considers 
relative unemployment rate dispersion as an indication of mismatch. We 
document that absolute differentials in unemployment rates across 
categories such as sex, age or region have increased as the overall 
rate has risen. Relative unemployment rate dispersion indices have, 
however ,  fallen over time in most of these categories; i . e . , mismatch 
measured in this way seems to have been reduced. 
In contrast, the estimation for Spain of a disequil ibrium model 
provides a measure of mismatch, understood as the heterogene.i ty of 
constraints on firms in different markets, which steadily increases 
over time. We f ind we can statistically explain the path fol lowed by 
this index by regressing i t  on a set of variables related to mismatch. 
On account of this and the casual evidence provided by the current 
overheating s ituation in Spain we reluctantly conclude that the 
disequil ibrium measure seems to provide a more accurate picture of the 
behaviour of mis��tch in Spain. 
Part of the rise in mismatch, as measured by the latter index, comes 
from the evolution of the regional distribution of economic variables. 
To gain a better understanding on this aspect of mismatch, and given 
that internal migration has steadily decreased in Spain s ince the early 
1960s, we set up and estimate an econometric system model l ing internal 
migra tion f lows and regional wage different ials. We find, on .the one 
hand , that interregional migration responds significantly to economic 
variables such as real wage and unemployment differentials, but with a 
relative small value and also with long lags. On the other hand, the 
overal l  unemployment rate and housing price differentials are also 
found to deter migration. We then simulate the dynamic response of the 
system to an exogenous increase in the unemployment rate of a region, 
f inding that the convergence of the process to a long-run equil ibrium 
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with compensating wage differentials is very slow. We infer that a 
regional policy targeted at moving jobs to people -in contrast to 
relying on the movement of people to jobs- could save a sizable amount 
of unemployment during the short- and medium run, specially start ing 
from a high national unemployment rate. Other policy recommendations, 
related to tax schemes and regional housing price measures are also 
drawn. 
A lot remains to be done. Our econometric model can still  be 
improved by including omitted variables, unavai lable at this time, but 
which are probably important, l ike those approximating the avai lab i l i ty 
of public goods and amenities, or the demographic characteristics of 
the population by region. Moreover, cross-section variation could 
be gained by repeating the exercise for provinces instead of the more 
aggregate regions. 
Similarly, this kind of dynamic system could be est imated for the 
case of mob! l i  ty across economic sectors. Also. the issue of ski l l  
scarcity, the only interest ing dimension where the unemployment 
dispersion mismatch index is increas ing in the recent past ,  should be 
explored. The construction sector. where shortages of manpower in 
general -and ski l l s  in particular- have been reported in the last few 
years, would be an extremely interesting sector to analyse. We have to 
leave these issues for further research. 
1 .  
2. 
3. 
4 .  
S. 
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APPENDIX � GROUPING OF REGIONS INTO � AGGREGATE REGIONS 
B I G  C I T I ES 
NORTH (NO) : 
(BC) : 
NORTHEAST ( NE ) :  
CENTRE ( CE ) : 
SOUTH (SO) : 
4.  
9 .  
13. 
3. 
6 .  
10.  
2 .  
15.  
16. 
17.  
7.  
8.  
12.  
1 .  
5 .  
1 1 .  
14. 
Baleares (BAL) 
Catalu/la ( CAT ) 
Madrid (HAD) 
Asturias ( AST ) 
Cantabr la (CNT) 
Pa i s  Vasco (PVA) 
Arag6n ( ARA )  
Navarra (NAV) 
La RloJa ( LRJ ) 
Valencia (VAL ) 
Cas t l l l a  La Mancha ( CU4 )  
Cast l l la Le6n (CLE) 
Ga l 1 c 1 a  (GAL) 
Anda luc i a  (AND) 
Canar l as (CAN) 
Extremadura ( EXT )  
Murcla (HUR) 
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APPENDIX 2: SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
A )  Migration and Population: 
The source is: Instituto . Nacional de Estadistica ( INE) ,  Anuarl0 
Estadistico de Espafia, years 1960 to 1981. 
B )  Labor force. employment and unemployment data: 
For national data, the source is: INE, Encuesta de Poblac16n Actl va, 
years 1964 to 1989. In the available disaggregate classifications, we 
have used the homogenisation of these data in Ministerio de Economia y 
Hacienda (MEH) (981 ) .  For regional employment and unemployment the 
source is: Banco de Bi lbao, Renta Naclonal de Espafia y su Dlstribuc16n 
·Provincial , issues of 1962 to 1985 (available every other year except 
for 1966 ) .  An interpolation to get annual data was done using the 
profile of the aggregate unemployment series from the first source in 
the previous paragraph. The levels were rescaled to that of the 
homogenised data in MEH ( 1981 ) .  
C )  Wages: 
The source is as for regional unemployment data. The series is 
nominal compensation of employees in the province divided by the number 
of wage earners. The interpolation to get annual data was done using 
the profile of the wage series in: INE, Encuesta de Salarios, 1962 to 
1986. Nominal wages were deflated by the consumer price index for each 
province · from: INE, Indice de Precios al Consumo, years 1962 to 1986. 
All provincial CPI series were set to 100 in 1962. Housing and rental 
prices are taken from the appropriate item in the retail price index. 
Regional data .were calculated by weighting each province' s wages by 
its share of dependent employment in the region. 
The aggregation of provinces into regions is the official one, 
established in 1918, extended backwards to 1962. 
Region aO a, 
AND 0 . 03 0 . 57 
( 0 . 7 7 )  ( 2 . 69 )  
ARA 0 . 09 -0 . 1 3 
( 0 . 76) ( 0 . 6 3 )  
AST -0 . 1 3 0 . 00 
( 1 , 3 6) ( 0 . 02) 
BAL -0.06 0 . 76 
( 1 . 29) ( 6 . 10) 
CAN 0 . 20 0 . 1 7 
( 1 . 27) (0. '0) 
CNT 0 . 00 0 . 26 
( 0 . 0 1 )  ( 0 . 90 )  
CL.M 0 . 0 1  0 . 50 
( 0 . 1 5  ) (4 . 64 )  
eL.E -0.29 0 . 50 
( 0 . 7 3 )  ( 2 . 16) 
CAT 0 . 01 0 . 26 
( 0 . 3 6 )  ( 2 . 6' )  . 
PVA 0 . 19 0 . 53 
( 1 . 42 )  ( 4 . 8 1 )  
EXT 0 . 03 O .  <\0 
( 0 . 70) ( 5 . 72 )  
GAL 0 . 05 0 . 16 
( 1 .  34) ( 0 . 72) 
MAD 0 . 03 0 . 40 
( 0 . 92) ( 3 . 32 )  
MUR 0 . 05 0 . 1 1  
( 1 . 04 )  ( 0 . 5 1 )  
NAV 0 . 40 · -0 . 2 1  
(' . 57) ( 1 . 7' )  
LRJ 0 . 03 -0 . 1 7 
( 0 . 8 3 )  ( 0 . 92) 
VAL 0 . 02 0 . 7 1 
( 0 . 07) ( 3 . 8 1 )  
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APPENDIX 3 
MIGRATION EQUATIONS 
llmi t=f30+13 1 llmi t-rtl32 m i  t·-l+f33&li t+f34&li t_l+f3Sl'!.ru i t+ 
f36ru i  t_l+f37(w i t/UNt) _l+f3a (pa i  t!uNt ) 
a2 a3 a. a5 a6 a7 aB 
-0 . 1 1  0 . 10 0 , 42 -0 . 1 1  -0 . 20 - 0 . 2 1  - 1 .  30 
( 1 , 23 ) ( 0 . 0 6 )  ( 0 . 2 5 )  ( 0 . 57) ( 3 . 04 )  ( 0 . 2 5 )  ( 1 ,  14) 
-0.02 -0.40 -1.  12 -0 . 12 - 0 , 6 7  0 . 97 0 . 12 
( 0 . 1 3 )  ( 0 . 80) (2 . 2 8 )  ( 0 . 95) ( 0 . 62) ( 0 . 56 )  ( 0 . 2 0 )  
--0 . 36 0 . 25 - 0 . 4 7  0 . 08 1 .  24 0 . 21+ - 0 . 1 8  
( 1 . 29 )  ( 0 . 52 )  ( 1 . 23 )  ( 1 .  0 1 )  ( 1 . 04 )  ( 0 . 7B) ( O . B O )  
-0 . 1 4 0 , 55 - 0 . 5 6  -0.07 -0 . 16 0 . 24 -0 . 6 1  
( 1 . 13 )  ( 1 . 3 6 )  ( 1 .  26) ( 0 . '7 )  ( 6 . 68 )  ( 1 , 24 ) ( 1 . 53 )  
- 0 . 5 1  0 . 57 --0.58 -() , 08 -0 . 67 0 . 6 1 0 . 3 3  
( 1 . 1 6 ) ( 0 . 9 9 )  ( 1 . 10) ( 1 . 0 4  ) ( 0 . 9 1 )  ( l .05) ( 0 . 70) 
--0 . 55 0 . 1 8  -0 . 4 1  0 . 01 -0 . 15 0 . 63 -0 . 3 3  
( 2 . 3 7) ( 0 . 9 1 )  ( 0 . ' 7 )  ( 0 . 1 3 )  ( 0 . 1 3 )  ( 1 . 57 )  ( 0 . 6 9 )  
-0 . 18 0 . 1 1  -1 . 85 0 . 1 6 -0.09 0 . 9 8  ..() . 3 5  
( 2 . 00 )  ( 1 . 0 1 )  ( 1 . 82 )  ( 1 . 10) ( 1 . 80) ( 1 .  8 6 )  ( 0 . 2 5 )  
- 0 . 2 4  0 . 50 �1 . Z3 -0 . 10 - 0 . 2 7  0 . 54 -0 . 2 7  
( 2 . '0 )  ( 0 . 72) ( 0 . 72) ( 0 . 2 6 )  ( 0 . 6 7 )  ( 0 . 58) ( 0 . 0 9 )  
-0 . 10 0 . 3 7  -1 . 25 - 0 . 2 1  ·-0 . 13 -0.20 -0 . 1 6 
( 1 . 51 )  ( 2 . 1 7 )  ( 1 . 8 3 )  ( 1 . 0 9 )  ( 6 . 01 )  ( 0 . 96) ( 1 .  '6) 
-D . H  o . lS -D . n  0 . 16 -0 . 22 0 . 17 -0 . 12 
( 6 . 3 5 )  ( 1 .05) ( 0 . 5 3 )  ( 0 . 8 3 )  ( 2 . 92 )  ( 0 . ' 9 )  ( O . SO) 
-0 . 15 0 . 1 8 -0.70 0 . 00 -0 . 1 4 - 0 . 2 0  -0 . 1 5 
( ' . 30) (0 . 92 )  ( 1 . 0 7 )  ( 0 . 0 6 )  ( 1 0 . 8 )  ( 0 . 4 4 )  ( 1 .00) 
·-0 . 19 -0.02 -0 . 71 -0.20 -0 . 1 3 1 .  4 1  - 0 . 9 5  
( 2 . 1 7 )  ( 0 . 0 ' )  ( 1 . 42 )  (2 . '9) ( 1 . 69) ( 2 . 47 )  ( 2 . 0 3 )  
-0.20 1 .  25 1 .  a2 0 . 10 -0 . 15 0 . 56 0 . 10 
( 2 . 66 )  ( 2 . 67 )  ( 2 . 1 7 )  ( 1 . 0; )  ( 3 . 52 ) ( 1 . 06 )  (0 . 82 )  
-0 . 19 0 . 1 9 -'0 . 73 -0.01 0 . 2a 0 . 99 - 0 . 6 5  
( 2 . 10 )  ( 0 . 5 3 )  ( 2 . 06 )  (0 . 22 )  ( 0 . 72 )  ( 2 . 20) ( 1 . 40) 
-0 . 3 5 0 . 45 0 . 10 -0 . 2 5  ·-2 . 16 0 . 63 - 1 .  87 
( ' . 24 )  ( 1 . 00 )  ( 0 . 1 6 )  ( 5 . 46 )  ( ; . 1 7 )  ( 1 . 7 5 )  ( 1 . 56) 
-0 . 1 7 0 . 42 -0.49 -0.29 -0 . 1 5  0 . 54 -0. 16 
( 1 . 3 3 )  ( 1 .  4 4 )  ( 1 . 62) ( 1 . 5 1 )  ( 3 . 77) ( 1 . 1 3 )  (0 3 8 )  
-0 . 23 0 . 8 7  -0 . 72 -0.01 -0 . 1 2 0 . 19 -0 . 13 
( 1 .  6 3 )  ( 2 . 42 )  ( 0 . 85) ( 0 . 0 6 )  ( 0 . 0 4 )  ( 1 . 14 ) ( 2 . 26 )  
Note : The coeffi cients a 7 and aa are multiplied by 1 0 .  
R2 0" 
0 . 3 6  2 . 06 
0 . 16 2 . 28 
0 . 05 2 . 0 1  
0 . 87 1 .  98 
0 . 05 1 .  38 
0 . 20 1 . 9 3  
0 . 77 1 .  95 
0 . 25 2 2 1  
O .  .. 2 . <\0 
0 S' 2 . 3 2 
0 . 89 2 . 3 7  
0 . 46 2 . 49 
O .  7. 2 . 43 
0 . 27 1 .  84 
0 . 76 1 .  79 
0 . 55 1 .  8 8  
0 . 52 2 30 
- ---
Region aD a 1  
AND -0 . 3 9 0 . 36 ( ' . 24 )  ( 1 . 51 ) 
ARA -0 . 0 1  -0 . 1 8 ( 1 . 56 )  (0 . 7 1 )  
AST 0 . 02 0 . 2 7 ( 1 .  0 3 )  ( 1 . 08 )  
OAl 0 . 0 1  0 . 7.2 (0 . 69 )  ( 1 . 56) 
CAN -0.02 0 . 1 5 ( 1 . 1 3 )  ( 0 . 79) 
eNT 0 . 02 0 . 3 3  (2 . 52 )  (2 . '5) 
elM -0.05 0 . 1 2 
(0 . 86 )  (0 . 6' )  
ClE -0.02 0 . 1 7 
(0 . 22 )  (0 . 57 )  
CAT 0 . 05 0 . 10 
( 3 . 0 3 )  ( 0 . 76) 
PVA 0 . 03 0 . 28 ( 4 . 2' )  ( 2 . 8 6 )  
I:::xr -0.08 0 . 52 ( 2 . 70) ( 0 . '6) 
GAL -0.03 0 . 10 
( 1 . 50) ( 0 . 2 8 )  
MAD 0 . 07 0 . 3 1  ( 2 . 1 6 )  ( 1 .  7 2 )  
MUR -0.08 0 . 24 (2 . 73 )  ( 1.  59) 
NAV -0.01 0 . 3 7  
( 1 . 76 )  (3 . 00) 
l"J O , QO 0 . 05 
( 0 . 10) (0 . 58 )  
VAl 0 . 00 0 . 09 
( 0 . 00 )  · ( 0 .  " )  
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APPENDIX 3 
WAGE EQUATIONS 
a2 a3 
-0 . 6 4 0 . 20 (1 . 7 9 )  ( 3 . 8 8 )  
0 . 52 -0 . 42 
(0 . 93 )  (0 . 68 )  
0 . 0 7  0 . 05 ( 0 . 10) ( 0 . 9 6 )  
0 . 3 4 0 . 04 
( 0 . 7 1 )  ( 3 . 0 ' )  
0 . 3 8 0 . 04 
( 0 . 8 3 )  ( 1 .  9 7 )  
-0 . 3 4  0 . 06 
( 0 . 3 7 )  ( 2 . 3 8 )  
-0 . 1 8 0 . 08 
( 0 . '9 )  ( 2 . '8 )  
0 . 8 1  0 . 2 1  (0 . 97 )  (0 . 02 )  
-0.09 0 . 56 
( 1 . 1 3 )  ( 3 . 07 )  
-0 . 1 8 0 . 05 ( 0 . 25) ( 3 . 55 )  
0 . 24 0 . 05 ( 1 .  0 3 )  ( 2 . 62 )  
0 . 64 -0 , 8 2  ( 0 . 8 7 )  ( 0 . 4 1 )  
0 . 08 0 . 68 (0 . 1 6 )  ( 0 . 65) 
0 . 40 0 . 04 
(1 . 03 )  ( 2 . 73 )  
-0 . 48 0 . 06 
( 1 .  3 3 )  (3 . 20) 
0 . 85 0 . 06 
( 2 . 00) (5. '7) 
0 . 26 0 . 07 
( 0 . ' 5 )  (7 . . 1 5 )  
a .  a s  R2 DW 
-0 . 43 0 . 1 1 0 . 44 2 . 15 ( ' . 27 )  ( 1 .  90) 
-0 . 07 0 . 10 0 . 04 2 . 00 (0 . 27 )  ( 1 . 20) 
··0 . 23 0 . 00 0 . 08 1 . 85 
( 1 .  6.) (0 . 08 )  
-0 . 3 9 0 . 05 0 . 58 2 . 00 
( 2 . 30 )  ( 0 . 99 )  
-0 . 2 7 0 . 0' 0 2. 2 . 22 ( 2 . 2 1 )  (0 . 60 )  
-0 . 3 8 0 . 03 0 .8 2 . 3 3 ( 3 . 8' )  ( 0 . 0 6 )  
-0 . 22 -0 . 1 1  0 , 3 1  2 . 3 4 
( 0 . 90) ( 1 . 68 )  
-0 . 3 1  0 . 00 0 . 1 1 2 . 10 
( 1 . 30) (0 . 00) 
-0 . 16 0 . 06 0 . 3 8 2 . 12 (3 . 2 1 )  (l . 80) 
- 0 . 2 7  0 . 19 0 . 65 2 . 1 5 ( 5 . 1 3 )  (2 . 93 )  
-0 . 20 0 . 1 2 0 . 60 2 . 30 ( 2 . '0) ( 2 . 1 4 )  
-0 . 53 - 0 .0 4 0 . 03 1 . 80 ( 1 . 8 3 )  ( 1 . 0 ' )  
-0 . 40 0 . 10 0 . 26 1 . 8 7  
( 2 .  ' 2 )  ( 1 . 2 8 )  
-{) . 45 0 , 02 0 . 53 2 . 26 (2 . 90) ( 1 . 00) 
-0 . 22 -0.02 0 . 6 4  . 70 
( 1 .  84) (0 . 3 3 ) 
--0 . 16 0 . 1 1  0 . 70 1 .  78 ( 1 . 70) ( 1 . 90) 
- 0 . 1 2 0 . 02 0 . 1 7 1 . 52 
( 1 .  6 3 )  (0 . 1 8 )  
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